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91 
MCCLEARY: POSITIVE RIGHTS, SEPARATION OF 
POWERS, AND TAXPAYER PROTECTIONS IN 
WASHINGTON’S STATE CONSTITUTION 
Kristen L. Fraser* 
INTRODUCTION 
When the delegates to Washington’s constitutional convention 
borrowed a clause from Florida’s 1868 Reconstruction constitution
1
 to 
introduce Washington’s 1889 education article, they little could have 
guessed that the “paramount duty” would become the most expensive 
phrase in state fiscal history, committing future taxpayers to support 
state K-12 education obligations that likely exceed $20 billion per fiscal 
biennium.
2
 In the landmark Seattle School District v. State
3
 case, the 
                                                     
* Kristen L. Fraser holds degrees in law and political science from the University of Washington. 
She is an adjunct professor of law at the Seattle University School of Law and senior counsel to the 
Office of Program Research, which provides non-partisan legal and budget support to the 
Washington State House of Representatives. The author’s views are her own and offered in her 
personal and academic capacities; they do not necessarily reflect advice given in her legislative 
capacity or the views of the House, its members, or its administration. The author would like to 
thank Professor Hugh Spitzer for his review of earlier drafts. 
1. “It is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the education of all the 
children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference.” FLA. CONST. of 1868 art. 
XII, § 1. Florida’s 1885 anti-Reconstruction constitution removed “paramount duty” and “ample” in 
favor of the less expansive “liberal maintenance.” FLA. CONST. OF 1885 art. XII, § 1.  
2. In the 2015–2017 biennial budget, State Near-General Fund plus Opportunity Pathways 
(NFGS + Op Path) appropriations for K-12 education totaled $18.156 billion. This equals 47.5% of 
the total appropriations of $38.2 billion from these accounts. (The NGFS consists of the state 
General Fund (GFS) and the Education Legacy Trust Account, plus the Opportunity Pathways 
Account.) STATE OF WASHINGTON, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET NOTES: 2015–17 BIENNIUM & 2015 
SUPPLEMENT 277 [hereinafter BUDGET NOTES], http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2015 
LBN.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFG5-847J]; see infra note 150 and accompanying text (describing 
nature of shortfall in state salary allocations). Estimates of the additional state funding necessary to 
address the shortfall in state salary allocations vary. Working from the assumption that ninety 
percent of actual average statewide district compensation payments to employees in the state-funded 
salary base is properly the state’s responsibility, the 2015 House budget chair published an estimate 
of an additional $3.5 billion per biennium. Ross Hunter, McCleary Phase II, ROSS HUNTER (Aug. 
24, 2015), http://s485995026.onlinehome.us/2015/08/mccleary-phase-ii/ [https://perma.cc/MW3A-
MFLG]. A bipartisan solution advocated by state senators in the 2015 legislative session also 
assumed a salary allocation funding gap of approximately that amount. Editorial, Capital Gains Tax 
Is Best Plan to Fund Senate Bipartisan Plan on Education, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 14, 2015, at A20. 
The McCleary plaintiffs suggest that the additional state funding required is $10 billion per 
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Washington State Supreme Court first interpreted the “paramount duty” 
clause of the Washington State Constitution to create a corresponding 
“true” or “absolute” right on the part of the state’s school children to 
receive an amply funded education.
4
 In his concurring opinion in Seattle 
School District, Justice Robert. F. Utter urged a conciliatory judicial 
response to the Legislature’s efforts, recommending that the Court 
respect the Legislature’s policy-setting processes by affirming the 
reforms the Legislature had enacted to respond to that lawsuit.
5
 
In McCleary v. State,
6
 the Washington State Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Seattle School District, and it initially appeared to consider 
Justice Utter’s earlier caution, offering deference to the Legislature’s 
endeavors by endorsing recently enacted legislation as a “promising 
reform package” which, “if fully funded,” would remedy school funding 
deficiencies.
7
 But, in a crucial departure from Seattle School District, the 
McCleary Court retained jurisdiction to monitor legislative progress 
toward article IX implementation. Building on McCleary’s renewed and 
expanded positive rights jurisprudence, the Court’s subsequent 
enforcement actions have resulted in a confrontation
8
 between the state’s 
legislative and judicial arms, a showdown in which the Court claims 




In this two-branch game of “Chicken,”
10
 the Court has thrice ordered 
                                                     
biennium. Joseph O’Sullivan & Jim Brunner, Court to State: Pay Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 14, 
2015, at A6.  
3. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).  
4. Id. at 511–13, 585 n.13, 585 P.2d at 91–93; see also WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the 
paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within 
its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” (emphasis 
added)).  
5. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 547–51, 585 P.2d at 109–19 (Utter, J., concurring). 
6. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). 
7. Id. at 484, 269 P.3d at 231. 
8. Such confrontations are discussed in Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional 
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2007). In this definition of a “showdown,” a disagreement 
between branches over government ends with “ambiguous acquiescence,” a total or partial implicit 
concession by one branch to the views of another that creates a judicial or extra-judicial 
constitutional precedent. Id. at 997. As discussed infra Section II.C at notes 114–115 and 
accompanying text, the nearly thirty years between a 1983 superior court ruling and the initial 
McCleary ruling could be characterized as a period of such acquiescence. 
9. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 519, 268 P.3d at 249 (asking whether the state, through the 
Legislature, has “done enough”). 
10. In game theory, Chicken provides each player with the highest payoff if it confronts while the 
other avoids, but mutual confrontation results in the worst outcome for both. Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 8, at 1024. 
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the Legislature to provide the Court with a specific, multi-year plan for 
phasing in a constitutionally adequate system of school finance, and the 
Legislature, though it has substantially increased
11
 school funding under 
the statutory plan endorsed by the Court in its original ruling, has thrice 
failed to provide the Court with a document dubbed a “plan.”
12
 So far, 
the confrontation has escalated to an unprecedented
13
 judicial 
declaration: the Legislature’s failure to legislate to the Court’s 
satisfaction puts the State in contempt of Court.
14
 In August of 2015 the 
Court sanctioned the State for this contempt by imposing a fine of 
$100,000 per day.
15
 Looming ahead is the 2018 deadline, a due date 
designated by the Legislature for specific statutory reforms and by the 
Court for ultimate article IX compliance. 
This Article is intended to bring a new institutional perspective to the 
state constitutional dialogue on positive rights—a viewpoint from an 
advocate for the branch that must enact the state’s policy and fiscal 
                                                     
11. 2015 REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 5–7 (July 27, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 REPORT], 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/2015%20Report.pdf 
[https:// perma.cc/RBK7-9XJP] (2015–2017 state budget funding levels reflect a thirty-six percent 
increase since the 2012 order criticizing lack of progress).  
12. Order of August 13, 2015, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_081315McC
learyorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN8K-6ZP7]; Order of Jan. 9, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 
269 P.3d 227, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/ 
20140109_843627_McClearyOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK3V-ZN8E]; Order of June 12, 2014, 
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/ 
supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf 




13. The Court declared that “[w]e have no wish to be forced into . . . as some state high courts 
have done, holding the legislature in contempt of court.” Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 8, McCleary, 173 
Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. According to the Attorney General, research uncovered no other case 
in which a state high court had held a state legislature in contempt. State of Washington’s Opening 
Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 10, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ 
OpeningBrief_20140711.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5VP-FGDM]; see also Kirk Johnson, Governor 
Seeks New Taxes as a Court Order Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015, at A13 (noting that legal 
scholars could not remember another example of a state high court holding an equal branch of 
government in contempt); cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279–80 (1990) (indicating 
that judicial enforcement of contempt sanctions directly upon a legislative body conflicts with 
legislators’ First Amendment rights as well as common-law legislative immunity). 
14. Order of Sept. 11, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order 
%20-%209-11-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2XG-ML5M]. 
15. Order of Aug. 13, 2015, at 9–10, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
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responses to judicial interpretations of the constitution.
16
 It will consider 
a specific aspect of the McCleary showdown:
17
 positive rights 
enforcement. Judicial enforcement of positive constitutional rights 
qualitatively differs from other constitutional enforcement in its effect 
on legislative policy-setting and the public fisc, but the Court has not 
expressly declared any limitations on its authority to define the scope of 
positive rights. This Article concludes that fiscal limits in the so-called 
“disfavored constitution”
18
 establish separation of powers principles that 
constrain the judiciary’s positive enforcement orders targeted at the 
political branches. 
Part I of this Article summarizes two distinctive aspects of state 
constitutions. First, it discusses constitutional affirmative duty clauses 
and associated scholarship which argues that these duties create 
judicially enforceable positive rights. Second, it outlines fiscal restraints 
in the so-called “disfavored constitution.” Commentators label these 
obscure tax and expenditure restrictions “disfavored” not because they 
are any less a part of state constitutions, but because courts and scholars 




Next, Part II discusses development of Washington’s positive 
education right in the Seattle School District and McCleary rulings. 
Then Part III briefly identifies unique separation of powers risks that 
could arise from the McCleary Court’s enthusiastic embrace of positive 
rights theories. Given the apparent absence of jurisprudential limits, 
judicial enforcement of positive rights against the Legislature could 
create an unquenchable public fiscal obligation—an obligation beyond 
the control of legislators and the voters who elect them. 
Part IV of this Article concludes that outer boundaries of judicial 
authority to enforce positive constitutional rights are already found 
                                                     
16. Again, as previously noted, the author’s views are her own. 
17. For additional background on McCleary, see Case Comment, Education Law—Washington 
Supreme Court Holds Legislature in Contempt for Failing to Make Adequate Progress Toward 
Remedying Unconstitutional Education Funding Scheme, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2048 (2015) 
(discussing McCleary developments through contempt order); Jessica R. Burns, Comment, Public 
School Funding and McCleary v. State of Washington—A Violation of the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine or a Legitimate Exercise of Judicial Autonomy?, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1437 (2014); 
Daniel C. Stallings, Comment, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K–12 Schools: Where the 
Legislature Went Wrong and What It Should Do to Meet Its Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 575 (2010). 
18. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional 
Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 910 (2003).  
19. See id.  
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within the constitutional text—in the “disfavored constitution.” Part IV 
argues that these fiscal controls are more than technical provisions—
rather, they are part of the electoral bargain, declaring affirmative 
separation of powers principles designed to protect the people and their 
relationship with the government to which they delegated political 
power.
20
 Under the constitutional terms of this delegation, only the 
people’s elected representatives have the authority to levy taxes
21
 and to 
authorize the expenditure of the revenues thereby raised.
22
 The 
disfavored constitution’s structural safeguards for the public fisc declare 
principles that stand on equal footing with other constitutional 
provisions. To the extent that Washington’s Constitution creates a 
positive education right, then these equally mandatory constitutional 
provisions counterbalance that right, requiring the Court to recognize 
textual restraints on judicial enforcement of positive rights. 
I.  POSITIVE DUTIES AND “DISFAVORED” FISCAL 
RESTRAINTS ARE TWO DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. In State Constitutionalism, Textual Affirmative Duties Give Rise to 
Positive Rights Theories 
The renaissance in state constitutionalism that began in the 1970s 
embraced many interrelated concepts of state constitutional 
independence. Justice Brennan’s call to action in his influential 1977 
article urged state courts to take a fresh, autonomous look at the way 
state constitutions could provide greater protections for civil liberties, 
ultimately resulting in the New Federalism movement.
23
 In a similar 
                                                     
20. “All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.” WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 1. 
21. “No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state 
distinctly the object of the same to which only it shall be applied.” WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5.  
22. “No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of 
the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law . . . . ” WASH. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 4. Under article VII, section 6, all state tax revenues must be deposited in the 
treasury. Ergo, state tax revenues may not be spent without an appropriation in law. See discussion 
infra Section IV.A.2. 
23. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489 (1977). See generally JAMES GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 24–25, 36–45 (2005); G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161–70 (1998); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF 
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 113–33 (2009). 
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manner, after San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez
24
 rejected higher-
level scrutiny for state education rights under the federal Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause,
 25
 school advocates turned to state 
constitutions’ equal protection clauses to find stronger safeguards for 
educational equity, eventually persuading many state courts that the 
education articles of state constitutions established substantive, judicially 
enforceable duties to provide an adequately defined and funded 
education.
26
 Finally, in a large body of academic commentary, scholars 
called for state court judges to emerge from the shadow of federal 
rationality review, recognize the inherent differences between state and 
federal judicial powers, and interpret state constitutions to provide 
“positive rights” to state taxpayer-funded services such as education, 
welfare, and health care.
27
 
1.  Within the Distinctive Structure of State Constitutions, 
Constitutional Texts Contain Affirmative Duties 
In an important contrast to federal constitutional content and 
structure, state constitutions contain duty language that directs states to 
enact specified types of laws or provide particular services. 
The federal Constitution does not confer a positive right to state 
government services.
28
 Instead, the federal Constitution is a “charter of 
                                                     
24. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
25. Id.  
26. See generally Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robyn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in 
Adequacy Litigation, 6 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 83, 90–95 (2010) (tracing history of “waves” in state 
constitutional school funding litigation).  
27. E.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990) 
(discussing the federal Constitution); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review 
of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1057 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State 
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Evolution]; Helen Hershkoff, 
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limitations of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131, 1133 n.9 (1999) (citing authorities) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights]; Helen 
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1833 (2001) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Passive Virtues]; Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and 
the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 890 (1989); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good 
Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State 
Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2009). Contra Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001). Positive rights scholarship specific to education rights also heavily 
favors positive rights, with the counterarguments generally based in textualist or originalist 
approaches. Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 723–26 (2012) 
[hereinafter Bauries, Education Duty] (citing scholarship of Eastman and Dinan).  
28. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (noting that 
Fourteenth Amendment duties arise only where the state has first restrained an individual, which is 
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 or a “series of governmental ‘thou shalt nots,’”
30
 
intended to shield individuals against government conduct without 
obligating the government to provide any particular services or 
protections to individuals.
31
 This characterization of the federal Bill of 
Rights as a charter against government is confirmed by doctrinal 
principles that limit federal courts’ ability to decide and enforce disputes 
that focus on government’s resource allocation decisions.
32
 
In contrast, a state constitution may establish a different, more 
intimate relationship
33
 between the government and its citizens. 
Structurally, state constitutions function as a limitation of the otherwise 
plenary power of state legislatures, whose law-making power is 
restricted only by the state and federal constitutions.
34
 Unlike Congress, 
when enacting laws, state legislatures need not point to a textual grant of 
power to legislate on a particular topic. Instead, they may pass any law 
not constitutionally forbidden. 
Even so, state constitutions frequently contain provisions authorizing, 
exhorting, or even directing state legislatures to adopt laws on particular 
topics.
35
 Education duty clauses are found in all state constitutions,
36
 and 
state constitutions may also direct state governments to provide other 
                                                     
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (holding education not a 
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Usman, supra note 27, at 1460–
61. 
29. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989).  
30. Neuborne, supra note 27, at 890.  
31. E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (noting the “Due Process Clauses generally confer no 
affirmative right to governmental aid”).  
32. See generally Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1876–83 (discussing the federal 
“case or controversy” requirement, political question doctrine, and other limitations). 
33. Cf. Hershkoff, Evolution, supra note 27, at 802 (arguing for state constitutional amendments 
“to create right of social citizenship that contemplates broad reciprocal bonds between the state and 
the individual”). 
34. See TARR, supra note 23, at 7–9; WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 249–54. Within this structure, 
courts have nonetheless found inherent powers within the judicial branch. See In re Salary of 
Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 245–46, 552 P.2d 163, 170–72 (1976) (listing “inherent” powers of 
judiciary); see also discussion of Juvenile Director infra notes 225–228 and accompanying text; 
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 296 (explaining that claims of inherent powers in the respective 
branches raise important but largely academic questions of political theory). 
35.  TARR, supra note 23, at 8–9; see also Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional 
Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on Constitution-Making in the American West, 25 
RUTGERS L.J. 945, 967–71 (1994) (discussing “constitutional legislation” and the role of directory 
clauses); John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the 
Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 947 (2007) (classifying education clauses).  
36. Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 n.5 (1991). 
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public services, such as support for their poor.
37
 For example, 
Washington’s Constitution contains not only an education duty, but also 
a directive to “foster and support” institutions for the mentally ill, 
developmentally disabled, and deaf, blind, or otherwise disabled youth.
38
 
Given the structure of state constitutions, affirmative “duty” language 
stands out, because directory provisions are “inherently contrary to the 
concept of a state constitution.”
39
 State governments exercise all 
governmental powers that remain after their constitutions’ restraints, so 
it is “theoretically unnecessary to spell out such residual powers.”
40
 
If these types of constitutional provisions are structurally superfluous, 
then why might state constitutional drafters have included them? Some 
drafters may have viewed them as policy statements not amenable to 
judicial enforcement. Thomas Cooley, the godfather of late ninteenth 
century state constitutionalism, generally cautioned against viewing 
constitutional text as directory rather than mandatory, but he drew a 
qualitative difference between self-executing provisions and “moral” 
requirements addressed to the legislature.
41
 He explained that no 
provision of a constitution is merely advisory, but some requirements are 
“incapable of compulsory enforcement.”
42
 Although their “purpose may 
be to establish rights or impose duties, they do not in and of themselves 
constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be 
protected or such duty enforced.”
43
 For this reason, the provision may be 
mandatory to the legislature, but “back of it there lies no authority to 
                                                     
37. E.g., Usman, supra note 27, at 1465–76 (listing possible types of positive rights). 
38. See Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The 
Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 872–76 (2000) 
[hereinafter Talmadge, Property Absolutism] (listing constitutional duties of state government 
intended to regulate social and commercial interaction of state and citizens).  
39. Fritz, supra note 35, at 970–71. 
40. Id. 
41. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 93 (5th ed. 1883) (discussing 
mandatory versus directory); id. at 98–99 (noting where legislation is necessary to implement a 
constitutional duty, the “requirement has only a moral force”). The treatise written by Judge Cooley, 
one of the most influential constitutional authorities of his day, was well known to the Territorial 
Supreme Court and in all likelihood known to the delegates of the Washington constitutional 
convention. Territorial Justices John P. Hoyt and George Turner, who cited Cooley during their 
tenure on the court, later served as delegates to the convention, with Hoyt elected president. See 
Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 145–46, 13 P. 453, 458 (1887) (citing COOLEY, supra); 
Maynard v. Hill, 2 Wash. Terr. 321, 326, 5 P. 717, 718 (1884) (citing COOLEY, supra); Maynard v. 
Valentine, 2 Wash. Terr. 3, 9, 3 P. 195, 196 (1880) (“Especially valuable we have found the 
observations of . . . Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations.”). The author would 
like to thank Pam Loginsky for calling this history to her attention.  
42. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 98. 
43. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Theodore Stiles, a delegate to the Washington State 
constitutional convention and later a Washington State Supreme Court 
justice, opined a quarter-century after statehood that notwithstanding the 
mandatory character of each clause, some of the constitution’s promising 
provisions depend for operation upon action by the Legislature.
45
 
Professor John Dinan, in his study of education clause debates at state 
constitutional conventions, argues that these clauses include obligatory 
language, but they “were not drafted for the purpose of enabling judicial 
scrutiny of legislative judgments regarding school financing.”
46
 
Alternatively, constitutional drafters, including those in the nineteenth 
century West, might have intended to protect state legislation by 
affirming, particularly against Lochner-esque challenges, that the 




2.  Scholars Argue That Textual Affirmative Duties Give Rise to 
Positive Constitutional Rights 
In a large body of scholarship, commentators argue that state 
constitutions include duty provisions for the express purpose of vesting 
judicially enforceable positive constitutional rights in individuals.
48
 Just 
                                                     
44. Id. at 99; see also Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and Forms of Judicial Review, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1909 (2004) (noting alternate institutional mechanisms exist by which rights 
may be enforced). 
45. Theodore L. Stiles, The Constitution of the State and Its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 
WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 286 (1913). Seattle School District v. State used Stiles’ observation to confirm 
the Legislature’s education funding failings. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 511, 585 P.2d 71 90, 91 (1978). 
46. Dinan, supra note 35, at 949; see also John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil 
Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 1 (1998) (describing originalist approach to education clause interpretation). 
47. Fritz, supra note 35, at 970–71; see also TARR, supra note 23, at 8–9, (explaining that grants 
of power may lead to negative implications); id. at 148–150 (Progressive-era constitutional duty 
language); John Dinan, Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 983, 993 (2007) (noting state constitutional amendments to address Lochner); 
Talmadge, Property Absolutism, supra note 38, at 872–76 (listing constitutional duties of state 
government intended to regulate social and commercial interaction of state and citizens). But cf. 
JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 123–30 (2006) (explaining 
that constitutional efforts to address Lochner took the form of efforts to limit judicial review).  
48. See, e.g., Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1138; Usman, supra note 27, at 1464–
76; see also supra note 26 (citing authorities); cf. TARR, supra note 23, at 147–50 (describing use of 
state constitutions to address positive rights and economic well-being). “While there is no apparent 
societal move toward recognizing positive constitutional rights, law reviews seem overwhelmingly 
in favor of such recognition.” Cross, supra note 27 at 859, 860 n.12 (citing Hershkoff, Positive 
Rights, supra note 27, at 1133 n.9). Needless to say, legal scholars are not in the business of 
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as the New Federalism movement encouraged state courts to step out 
from the shadow of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting civil 
liberties protections, positive rights advocates comprehensively argue 
that fundamental differences between state and federal constitutions 




To demonstrate that constitutional affirmative duties establish 
corresponding positive rights, theorists have cited the writings of legal 
philosopher Wesley Hohfeld.
50
 Hohfeld is best known for developing an 
analytical framework to explain legal rights, a structure that 
characterizes “rights” based on different types of paired relationships.
51
 
In a Hohfeldian analysis, an affirmative duty to provide necessarily 
correlates to an affirmative right to receive—the Hohfeldian binary 
framework cannot conceive of a duty without such a corresponding 
right.
52
 For that reason, positive rights scholarship argues that 
constitutional “duty” language must create corresponding positive rights. 
What, then, is a positive constitutional right, and how does it differ 
from a “negative” right? 
The distinction between positive and negative rights is an 
intuitive one: One category is a right to be free from 
government, while the other is a right to command government 
action. A positive right is a claim to something . . . while a 
negative right is a right that something not be done to one.
53
 
Stated differently, “if there was no government in existence, would the 
right be automatically fulfilled?”
54
 Admittedly, if there is no 
government, there are no “legal” rights, a status potentially characterized 
as “[s]tatelessness spells rightlessness.”
55
 But the absence of a state 
                                                     
balancing state budgets. 
49. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1170–91; see also Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, 
supra note 27 at 1888–90. 
50. Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in 
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 304–10 (2011) [hereinafter Bauries, 
Conceptual Convergence]; see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–31 (1913). 
51. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 306–26 (summarizing Hohfeld’s 
rights in the context of school finance litigation). 
52. Id. at 316 (“None of the other Hohfeldian relationships map cleanly on the right to receive an 
entitled action, service, or set of resources.”). 
53. Cross, supra note 27, at 864. This definition is suggested by Professor Cross, a rare positive 
rights skeptic. 
54. Id. at 866. 
55. Id. (citing STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 19 (1999)). 
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means that one is by definition free from intrusive state action “done to 
one.” 
Rights established by the federal Constitution are negative in nature. 
True, federal constitutional rights frequently require the state to provide 
publicly funded services to individuals
56
—services that could be 
characterized as “a claim to something.” For example, the federal 





 and “minimally adequate care and treatment” 
for involuntarily confined persons such as those with mental illness.
59
 
However, federal constitutional rights are not truly positive rights, 
because the state’s constitutional duty is predicated on the initial state 
action “done to” the individual. If the state declines to undertake the 
initial state action, it may avoid the duty to provide the associated 
services. 
In contrast, positive rights impose a qualitatively different type of 
duty on government: “Positive rights do not restrain government action: 
they require it.”
60
 If a constitutional affirmative duty creates a 
corresponding positive right, such as education or subsistence, only the 
government can fulfill the right, and it must do so. Without regard to any 
legislation or state-initiated action, the mere presence within the state of 
an individual who possesses a positive constitutional right triggers a 
state duty to provide publicly funded services. Simply put, in positive 
rights advocacy such a right imposes an unavoidable duty on the state 
and its taxpayers to support the program as mandated and defined by the 
judicial interpretation of the constitution. 
B. The “Disfavored Constitution” Establishes Taxpayer Protections 
in the Form of Fiscal Restrictions on the State 
Just as positive duties are distinctive characteristics of state 
constitutions, so are fiscal restraints.
61
 In another form of contrast to the 
federal Constitution, state constitutions consistently give extensive 
consideration to state and local taxing, spending, and borrowing. These 
public fiscal controls “seek to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities 
                                                     
56. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1896 (noting budget implications). 
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
58. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
59. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982). 
60. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 519 269 P.3d 227, 248 (2012) (citing Hershkoff, 
Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1137). 
61. Briffault, supra note 18, at 908.  
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and costs of government.”
62
 
Commentators use the term “disfavored constitution”
63
 to describe 
fiscal restrictions not because these provisions are any less a part of state 
constitutions, but because they are a distinctly un-sexy aspect of state 
constitutionalism, especially when compared to the civil liberties of the 
New Federalism or the state-funded services of positive rights 
scholarship. The disfavored constitution is of little interest to academics 
and advocates, and of far more interest to the practitioners who facilitate 
the day-to-day operations of state governments. 
Further, fiscal limits are also disfavored by courts, which often read 




First, courts tend to treat fiscal limits not as issues of 
fundamental rights—like speech, religion, or privacy—or as 
matters fundamental to government structure—like separation of 
powers, bicameralism, or federalism—but rather as ordinary 
legislation. . . . Second, the state courts often appear quite 
sympathetic to the goals of the programs that would be curbed 
by the fiscal limits.
65
 
As set forth in more detail at infra Section IV.A, by reserving taxing 
and spending authorities to the legislative branch, the fiscal restrictions 
of the disfavored constitution also operate as separation of powers 
requirements. 
II.  THE BASIS FOR A POSITIVE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN 
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 
The “paramount duty” clause of the Washington Constitution’s 
                                                     
62. Id. at 908; see also TARR, supra note 23, at 21 (explaining that finance and taxation 
provisions are common features of state constitutions); WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 28 (state 
constitutions contain long articles on taxation and finance, “two of the most important functions of 
any government”); cf. James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 985, 985 (1993) (state constitutional text “obsesses in excruciating detail over 
pecuniary matters”). 
63. Briffault, supra note 18, at 910. 
64. Id. at 910. 
65. Id. at 939–41. Regarding the latter point, Briffault’s characterization of judicial sympathy 
applies specifically in the context of fiscal limits that attempt to restrict financial projects of the 
“modern activist state”—roads, convention centers, etc., and of the risks of too much judicial 
deference to the political branches, rather than not enough. But his point applies either way—
whether potential infringement comes from the legislature or from the courts, fiscal restrictions in 
state constitutions are meaningful expressions of the relationship that the voters intended to have 
among themselves, their elected representatives, and the public fisc. 
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education article has resulted in two remarkable decisions from the 
Washington State Supreme Court. In Seattle School District and 
McCleary, the Court has twice ruled that article IX, section 1 imposes an 
affirmative duty on the State that creates its Hohfeldian “jural 
correlative”—a positive right on the part of the state’s children to have 
the State define and amply fund a program of basic education. McCleary 
took a further step by retaining jurisdiction over the case to monitor 
legislative implementation, culminating in an unprecedented contempt 
ruling against the State over the Legislature’s failure to legislate to the 
Court’s satisfaction. 




 education clauses are consistent features of 
state constitutions, appearing in the constitutional texts of all fifty 
states.
67
 But article IX, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution 
contains singular terminology
68
: “It is the paramount duty of the state to 
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its 




Washington’s Constitution is unique in declaring that “ample 
provision” for education is “the paramount duty of the state.”
70
 In textual 
                                                     
66. Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at 719.  
67. McUsic, supra note 36, at 311 n.5.  
68. Recent constitutional amendments and new constitutions contain comparatively strong 
education language. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (amended 2002) (“a paramount duty to make 
adequate provision” (emphasis added)); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1983) (“a primary 
obligation” to make adequate provision (emphasis added)); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (amended 1970) 
(educational development a “fundamental goal”; state must provide a “high quality” education). 
None of these states finds a positive right to education. See infra note 76 (citing cases). 
69. Washington’s historical record offers no insight into why the framers of our constitution 
included this extraordinary clause. The working draft constitution proposed to the delegates by W. 
Lair Hill recommended a “thorough and efficient” schools clause based on the 1870 constitution of 
Illinois. W. LAIR HILL, A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE 64 (1889) 
http://lib.law.washington.edu/waconst/Sources/Hill%20Constitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D9R-
HBFB]; see JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at v-vi 
(1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL] (mentioning the influence of Hill’s constitutional draft); ILL. CONST. 
of 1870 art. VIII, § 1. The “paramount duty” clause inspired no debate, and discussion of the 
educational article at the constitutional convention focused on the need to protect the federal 
educational endowment from mismanagement. JOURNAL, supra, at 276–78, 685–88. See generally 
L.K. Beale, Comment, Charter Schools, Common Schools & the Washington State Constitution, 72 
WASH. L. REV. 535 (1997) (describing history of schools in Washington). 
70. Compare WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added), with supra note 68 (providing other 
high-duty text examples). 
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analyses that rank the verbal intensity of states’ education finance 





 and they place the Washington State Supreme Court as 
among “the most liberal leaning courts” on this issue.”
73
 
State constitutional education clauses have resulted in “waves” of 
litigation.
74
 Notably, litigation outcomes in the various states do not 
necessarily correlate with the verbal strength of the respective 
constitutional texts.
75
 Courts in states with “high duty” clauses have 
refused to find fundamental or otherwise judicially enforceable rights, 
while states with mild, generic language have experienced active judicial 
enforcement of education clauses.
76
 
In Washington’s education jurisprudence, however, an exceptional 
text receives an exceptional interpretation. Seattle School District is a 
“third wave” decision—one based on arguments that the constitutional 
language imposes a substantive standard for education quality and 
funding. McCleary is a “fourth wave” ruling—one in which advocates 
sought to re-litigate previous victories after perceived state regression.
77
 
                                                     
71. Willam S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Reexamination of the 
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 
1245 (2003). 
72. William E. Thro, School Finance Reform, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis 
in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 540 n.40 (1998); Dinan, supra note 35, at 929 
n.13. 
73. Amanda Marra, State Constitutional Law—Thorough and Efficient Education—The Right to a 
Thorough and Efficient System of Education Trumps the Power of the Appropriations Clause in 
New Jersey, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 771, 795 (2013). These “liberal” courts are more likely to be found in 
liberal states. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational 
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 716–17 
[hereinafter Bauries, Judicial Review] (describing political factors associated with education 
litigation outcomes). 
74. For discussion of the various waves, see generally Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at 
726–30; Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 89–95.  
75. Dinan, supra note 35, at 929–30 (“[D]isembodied parsing of constitutional terminology may 
be of limited or no value.”); Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 712–15 (surveying studies; 
no clear relation between constitutional language and outcome). 
76. Thro, supra note 72, at 541; see also supra note 68 (providing constitutional texts); McDaniel 
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (holding textual “primary obligation” did not oblige the State 
to equalize opportunities between districts); Blasé v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ill. 1973) (declaring 
that 1970 clause states a purpose or goal, not a legislative obligation). Arguably, it is harmful to 
state constitutionalism that so many state judicial rulings distill diverse education texts into a 
homogenized educational right. Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to 
Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 988 (2014) [hereinafter Bauries, Right to Education]; Bauries, 
Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 303–04.  
77. See generally Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 84–86 (discussing recent failed 
lawsuits, including first-impression and second-round adequacy cases, in 2005–2008). 
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Although these last-wave lawsuits have generally failed to persuade state 
high courts that judicial intervention is required or appropriate,
78
 
Washington, as always, is a special case. In both rulings, the Washington 
State Supreme Court used the power of judicial interpretation to find that 
Washington’s unique text creates a positive right vested in the state’s 
schoolchildren. 
B.  Seattle School District: Article IX Creates a True, Absolute Right 
Although McCleary’s 2012 positive rights ruling triggered an 
unprecedented confrontation between the state Legislature and judiciary, 
the holding did not spring forth fully armed from the Court’s collective 
brow. On the contrary, McCleary is entirely rooted in its 1978 
predecessor, Seattle School District, differing primarily in its express 




The landmark Seattle School District case held that the “paramount 
duty” clause of article IX, section 1 establishes a mandate on the State 
that requires, as a first priority, fully sufficient funds for a “general and 
uniform system of public schools.”
80
 This right is unique in the nation.
81
 
The Washington State Supreme Court was the first state high court to 
address educational adequacy in the absolute sense, and the Seattle 
School District opinion is “the most lengthy and comprehensive analysis 
of the question of state constitutional education rights found among all 
                                                     
78. In most cases, these last-wave suits have failed to persuade state high courts that judicial 
intervention is required or appropriate. Id., supra note 26, at 84–86 (citing cases from 
Massachusetts, Kentucky, New York, South Carolina, Arizona, Alaska, and Nebraska). More recent 
examples include Dwyer v. State, 357 P. 3d 185, 193 (Colo. 2015) (holding that state cuts to school 
funding did not violate constitutional education funding requirements), Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 
1132, 1137 (Colo. 2013) (holding that funding formulae were valid as “rationally related” to 
constitutional objective), and Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2011) (rejecting claim due to 
failure of proof). Contra Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014) (still pending amidst multiple 
appeals and remands); Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011). Abbott is discussed in Marra, 
supra note 73. 
79. For a discussion of the legal developments that culminated in the Seattle School District 
ruling, see Koski, supra note 71, at 1245–49. See also Northshore Sch. Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 
2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) (rejecting an earlier article IX challenge). 
80. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71 90, 95 (1978). 
81. See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at 723–24 (noting only Washington has taken 
correlativity analysis this far); Bauries, Right to Education, supra note 76, at 999 n.224 (noting only 
the Washington State Supreme Court has ventured into Hohfeldian analysis). But see Bauries, 
Education Duty, supra note 27, 66at 737–39 (characterizing Seattle School District as finding 
legislative duty and not positive individual entitlement). 
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In Seattle School District, the Court began by emphasizing the 
judicial branch’s primacy in constitutional interpretation, citing Marbury 
v. Madison’s
83
 axiom that it “is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”
84
 Anticipating arguments 
that the constitution vests policy and fiscal powers in the democratically 
elected branches, making the matter a political question, the Court 
explained that once the Court determines that the dispute requires 
constitutional interpretation, there is no separation of powers issue, and 
“the matter is strictly one of judicial discretion.”
85
 
Having resolved the primacy issue, the Washington State Supreme 
Court then turned its interpretive focus to the precise text of article IX, 
section 1. Seattle School District used the Court’s power of 
interpretation to transform a single word of constitutional text into an 
expansive, paragraphs-long meditation about the role of public 
education. The constitutional term “education” embraces far more than 
“mere reading, writing and arithmetic.” Instead, the Court declared that 
the State must prepare its children to participate in both the political and 
economic marketplaces—otherwise, the right to an amply funded 
education “would be hollow indeed.”
86
 
Next, the Court considered the term “paramount.” The “framers 
declared only once in the entire document that a specified function was 
the State’s paramount duty,” and nothing shows that article IX, section 1 
was a mere preamble
87
 or otherwise had secondary status.
88
 The Journal 
does not show any intent that the clause is a mere preamble because the 
Journal does not say anything about the paramount duty clause. The 
delegates’ reasons for borrowing the clause from the 1868 Florida 
                                                     
82. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 338–39. 
83. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
84. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 496, 585 P.2d at 83 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176)). 
85. Id. at 504–05, 585 P.2d at 88 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). In other 
words, in a separation of powers dispute involving the judicial branch, judicial interpretational 
authority means that the branch whose actions are alleged to breach separation of powers has the 
authority to decide whether its actions in fact have that effect.  
86. Id. at 517–18, 585 P.2d at 94. 
87. Notwithstanding the caption “preamble” on article IX, section 1, under article I, section 29, 
all provisions of the Washington Constitution are mandatory. Id. at 500, 585 P.2d at 85. The original 
constitution did not contain part or section headers, so nothing in its text designated article IX, 
section 1 as a preamble. Id. at 499, 585 P.2d at 85. 
88. Id. at 510, 585 P.2d at 91.  
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Constitution are not stated in the Journal.
89
 Further, by definition, only 
one function may be “paramount,” so it is not surprising that the framers 
used the term only once. 
To conclude that article IX, section 1 created a “social, economic and 
educational duty as distinguished from a mere policy or moral 
obligation,” the Seattle School District Court again cited the 
observations of Theodore Stiles: “No other state has placed the common 
school on so high a pedestal.”
90
 However, the Court did not analyze 
Stiles’ full statement, which optimistically expresses the view that 
federally granted state school lands would be sold to provide the 
Permanent Common School Fund with an irreducible endowment “of 
$25,000,000, an endowment greater than that of any other educational 
system now existing.”
91
 The delegates’ lofty goals for the Permanent 
Fund collapse when faced with modern K-12 funding demands: in the 
2013–2015 biennium, revenue sources related to the endowment equal 
about one percent of total state K-12 operating appropriations.
92
 
                                                     
89. JOURNAL, supra note 69, at 685–91 (discussing education article). Due to a shortfall in the 
congressional appropriation for the convention, the shorthand notes were never transcribed, so the 
Journal contains only an abstract of motions and votes. Id. at vi–vii. 
90. Seattle School District, 90 Wash. 2d at 510–11, 585 P.2d at 90–91 (citing Stiles, supra note 
45, at 284). 
91. Stiles, supra note 45, at 284; see WASH. CONST. of 1889 art. IX, § 3. Stiles may have based 
his expectation of a generous school endowment on a belief that after statehood not only would the 
state sell the federally granted state-owned lands, but the federal government would also sell 
federally owned lands within the state. Per the Enabling Act, the state receives five percent of 
federal sale proceeds. See Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s 
Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148—The Transfer of Public 
Lands Act, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1133 (arguing framers of western state constitutions understood 
enabling legislation as federal government’s promise to sell federal lands after statehood). 
92. A comparison of revenues related to the statehood-era land endowment and state expenditures 
for K-12 shows that the former is only about 1.1% of the latter. There are two main types of state 
revenues attributable to the federal land endowment: timber revenues from state school lands and 
interest earnings of the Permanent Common School Fund. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 3, amended by 
WASH. CONST. amend XLIII; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.515 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Under 
Amendment 43, which was ratified in 1966, both types of revenue are deposited in the Common 
School Construction Fund (CSCF), from which they may be appropriated only for common school 
construction. The CSCF also receives rental and other earnings, which are likewise restricted. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.515.320 (2014 & Supp. 2015). At statehood, only interest and rental 
earnings would have been available for appropriation to schools, because timber revenues were 
deposited in the principal of the Permanent Common School Fund (then designated the “Common 
School Fund”). WASH. CONST. of 1889 art. IX, § 3.  
  Even though the endowment-related revenues now may be used only for school 
construction and not school operations, a comparison of those revenues to state expenditures for 
school operations shows how modern school funding requirements vastly exceed the endowment 
revenues on which the delegates might have relied. (The present calculation is based on actual 
CSCF revenues and state NGFS + Op expenditures for the 2013–2015 biennium, because full 
revenue estimates for the 2015-2017 biennium are not published yet.) Specifically, in the 2013–
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But most significantly, the Seattle School District Court considered 
the constitutional term “duty,” and it used the judiciary’s interpretational 
authority to turn the lead of duty into the gold of a true or absolute right. 
By imposing a paramount duty, the constitution simultaneously 
established that duty’s “jural correlative,” a corresponding paramount 
right on the part of the state’s children to have the State make ample 
provision for their education. 
93
 
In a lengthy and abstract footnote, the Court relied on Hohfeld to 
explain the theoretical basis of this “jural correlative” right.
94
 The Court 
embraced Hohfeld’s distinction between “absolute” rights, which 
correspond only to an unavoidable duty, and other so-called rights, 
which are really liberties or immunities that may be impaired upon a 
judicially cognizable reason.
95
 Most significantly, the Court explained 




The Court’s theory-dense justification demonstrates an independent 
state constitutionalism struggling to emerge from the strictures of 
constitutional interpretation based on federal Fourteenth Amendment 
terminology.
97
 The discussion repudiates the idea that state constitutional 
                                                     
2015 fiscal biennium, the Permanent Common School Fund earned $16.9 million in interest; this 
amount is deposited into the CSCF. Estimated and Actual State Revenue Source Reports, WASH. ST. 
REVENUE, http://fiscal.wa.gov/Revenue.aspx [https:// perma.cc/3ULM-RXDG ] (last visited Jan. 19, 
2016) (select dropdown menu next to “Biennium” and select “2013-15 Biennium,” select dropdown 
menu next to “List” and select “Common School Construction Account,” select “View Report” to 
retrieve the data, click the plus sign next to “Public Schools,” click the plus sign next to “Special 
Appropriations” to open all the data). In 2013–2015, revenues to the CSCF from timber, rentals, and 
other sources totaled $156.6 million. Id. Total CSCF revenues for 2013–2015 were thus $173.4 
million. Id. (the data at fiscal.wa.gov treat debt service payable from the CSCF as a revenue 
reduction rather than an expenditure, so for purposes of this analysis the amount attributable to debt 
service payments is added back in as revenue. Id.) In contrast, the state’s total actual NGFS + Op 
expenditures for K-12 in the 2013–2015 biennium were $15.3 billion. 2015 REPORT, supra note 11, 
at 7, 38–39. This means that that in 2013–2015, CSCF revenues equal 1.1% of state K-12 operating 
expenditures. In the 2015–2017 biennium, due to the significant increase in state K-12 spending, see 
supra note 11, this percentage is likely to be even smaller. 
93. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash.2d at 511–12, 585 P.2d at 91. 
94. Id. at 513 n.13, 585 P.2d at 93 n.13 (citing WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 47 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1964); see also  
Hohfeld, supra note 50, at 30–31. 
95. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 513 n.13, 585 P.2d at 93 n.13. 
96. Id. 
97. This reasoning represents an early version of Hershkoff’s rejection of the limits of rationality 
review. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1153–56. Much of this portion of Seattle 
School District is drawn from Justice Stafford’s dissent in the failed 1974 article IX case Northshore 
School District v. Kinnear, which expressly argued against borrowing federal rationality 
terminology and in favor of analysis based solely on the state constitution. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 752–
56, 530 P.2d 178, 214–17 (1974) (Stafford, J., dissenting). 
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analysis should replicate the sliding federal scale, “sizing constitutional 
rights like eggs and governmental interests like olives, from medium to 
jumbo.”
98
 In so doing, the Court correctly focused on the state text rather 
than importing federal rationality analysis. 
But, having appropriately turned to the state text, the Court then failed 
to appropriately scrutinize its wording.
99
 Rather than analyzing the 
meaning of the term “duty” in light of the constitutional text, structure, 
and history, the Court instead focused on “paramount,” borrowing 
Hohfeld’s abstractions to find a positive legal right in a text that declares 
only a duty. It is hard to say whether this is the result of too much 
judicial imagination, by assuming that Hohfeld’s analysis could be 
applied to state constitutional interpretation, or too little, by failing to 
recognize that there are more things in state constitutions than are 
dreamt of in Hohfeld’s binary philosophy.
100
 The Court did not consider 
whether constitutional drafters may have intended to create affirmative 
state duties without creating corresponding Hohfeldian claim-rights.
101
 
Because Holfeldian analysis assumes that “rights” are judicially 
enforceable, it obscures the possibility of other constitutional 
mechanisms (such as legislative action) to satisfy the affirmative duty.
102
 
Particularly when considered in light of Cooley’s cautions about duties 
that may be given meaning only by the Legislature,
103
 only through the 
alchemy of judicial interpretation does the framers’ textual choice to 
establish a duty, even a paramount duty, create the “jural correlative” of 
a personal “absolute” right. 
Having transmuted a duty into a right, the Court explained that it, not 
the Legislature, has the final word on interpreting the scope—and 
consequently the cost—of the right’s implementation. Again, the Court 
relied on Marbury and judicial primacy in constitutional 
                                                     
98. Hans Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed 
Discourse, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 953 (1993). 
99. Cf. Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 799 n.31, 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 n.31 (1997) 
(“Appropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there 
as well.”). 
100. See Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1909 (noting constitutional rights may be enforced by non-
judicial means). Hohfeld’s framework was developed for private law, but constitutional law does 
not necessarily involve the simple, dualistic relationship structure of common-law relations such as 
torts or contracts. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 309. 
101. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 325 (concluding education duties may 
be read to create such rights, but the conclusion is not inevitable); see also Dinan, supra note 35, 
939; Eastman, supra note 46 (discussing originalist approach to education clause interpretation). 
102. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1909. 
103. See COOLEY, supra note 41; see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing separation of powers 
risks of enforcing undefined provisions). 
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 It conceded that the administrative and organizational 
details of the public schools fall within the Legislature’s province under 
the “general and uniform” clause’s express vesting of that authority in 
the legislative branch, but ultimately the Court, as arbiter of 
constitutional meaning, determines whether the Legislature has acted 
pursuant to the article IX, and whether it has done so constitutionally.
105
 
Notwithstanding the breadth of the rights the majority had found in 
the constitutional text, the Seattle School District Court engaged in 
“remedial abstention,”
106
 stopping short of ordering the Legislature to 
enact any particular scheme of funding legislation. The Court had “great 
faith” in the Legislature’s ability to define and fund a program of basic 
education.
107
 Not only did it give the State additional time to come into 
compliance, but it expressly declined to retain jurisdiction over the case, 
making this one of the few points on which the high Court overruled the 
well-regarded trial court decision. According to Seattle School District, 
retained jurisdiction was “inconsistent with the assumption that the 




Notably, Justice Utter declined to sign on to the full scope of the 
Court’s rights analysis. Though he agreed with the majority that article 
IX, section 1 “guarantees a right of education to the state’s children,” he 
would have invalidated the system of local levy financing without going 
on to hold that the constitution mandates provision of a “specific ‘basic 
education.’”
109
 Turning the meaning of “education” into constitutional 
doctrine “deprives the people of this state of a continuing legislative and 
political dialogue on what constitutes a proper education.”
110
 Because 
the Legislature had acted “responsibly and exhaustively through its own 
uniquely constituted fact-finding and opinion-gathering processes,” he 
urged restraint and a limited holding.
111
 
                                                     
104. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496–97, 502–07, 585 P.2d 71, 83–84, 86–89 
(1978). 
105. Id. at 518, 585 P.2d at 95. 
106. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 724–25 (maintaining judicial legitimacy by 
adjudicating merits but avoiding injunctive remedial orders). 
107. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 537, 585 P.2d at 104. 
108. Id. at 538, 585 P.2d at 105. 
109. Id. at 546–47, 585 P.2d at 109 (Utter, J., concurring). 
110. Id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 109. 
111. Id. at 551, 585 P.2d at 112. 
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C.  McCleary: A Generation Later, the Positive Right Is Reaffirmed 
and Expanded 
Even before the Seattle School District Court ruled on appeal in 1978, 
the Legislature had responded to the January 1977 trial court ruling
112
 
with comprehensive school funding legislation.
113
 This proof of 
constitutional good faith, together with the Washington State Supreme 
Court’s refusal to oversee the legislative process, allowed the Legislature 
and the Court to reach a détente of “ambiguous acquiescence”
114
 for the 
next thirty-plus years.
115
 In the intervening period, the Legislature 
engaged in a large number of studies and enacted various education 
reforms,
116
 and the Court ruled on challenges to specific aspects of 
school funding,
117
 but in none of these cases was the Court required to 




Filed on January 11, 2007, almost forty years to the day after the trial 
court ruling in Seattle School District, the McCleary suit asked the court 
to revisit the positive rights it had recognized in the earlier leading 
case.
119
 As McCleary moved toward trial, the Legislature continued to 
study proposals for school funding reform through the 2007–2008 work 
of the Basic Education Finance Task Force. In 2009, before the 
                                                     
112. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Thurston Cty. Super. Ct. Jan 14, 1977). 
113. 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606. 
114. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1017 (“[A]mbiguous acquiescence reflects a point 
midway between the extremes of showdown and acquiescence.”). 
115. A short confrontation occurred in the recession of the early 1980s, in which legislative 
budget cuts resulted in subsequent legislative acquiescence to their prohibition in Judge Doran’s 
1983 ruling known as Seattle School District II. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 489–90, 
540–41, 269 P.3d 227, 234, 258–59 (2012) (discussing Seattle School District II facts and trial court 
ruling). 
116. See id. at 490–501, 269 P.3d 234–41 (summarizing studies and legislation). 
117. Sch. Dist. Alliance v. State, 170 Wash. 2d 599, 244 P.3d 1 (2010) (rejecting claim that 
special education funding formula violated constitution); Fed. Way Sch. Dist. v. State, 167 Wash. 
2d 514, 219 P.3d 941 (2009) (holding variations in “minutiae” of funding formulas did not conflict 
with “general and uniform” requirement); Brown v. State, 155 Wash. 2d 254, 119 P.3d 341 (2005) 
(deciding reduction in funding on statutory grounds); McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 293–
94, 60 P.3d 67, 74–75 (2002) (invalidating declaration that salary increases for teachers outside the 
basic education program were part of the state’s article IX obligation); Tunstall v. State, 141 Wash. 
2d 201, 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (holding the State satisfied duty to provide education to youth in 
Department of Corrections facilities).  
118. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 511–13, 513 n.13, 585 P.2d 71, 91–93, 92 n.13 
(1978). 
119. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 SEA (King Cty. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Thurston Cty. Super. Ct. 
Jan 14, 1977). 
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McCleary trial court’s ruling, the Legislature enacted ESHB 2261, 
which among other reforms included a framework for substantial 
revision of the state’s K-12 funding methodology.
120
 The following year, 
in SHB 2776, the Legislature provided details for the new formula, 
revising foundational state allocations under a new “prototypical school” 
model and specifying a phase-in schedule for particular new 
enhancements to the funding formula, such as all-day kindergarten and 
class size reductions in grades K-3, with final implementation of these 
reforms due in 2018.
121
 The new funding formulas took effect in 2011, 
during the depths of the Great Recession, and the 2011–2013 budget 
made only slight progress toward funding the new formula 
enhancements.
122
 Going into the 2012 legislative session, the state fiscal 
condition was so dire that Governor Christine Gregoire’s proposed 
supplemental budget recommended cutting four days from the 180-day 
state-funded school year.
123
 On January 5, 2012, a month after the close 
of a special legislative session to enact further budget cuts and just days 
before the opening of the 2012 regular legislative session, the 
Washington State Supreme Court published its McCleary ruling.
124
 
Written by Justice Stephens on behalf of a unanimous Court,
125
 
McCleary reaffirmed and expanded upon two key aspects of Seattle 
School District. First, the Court underscored its earlier ruling on the 
primacy of the judicial branch in constitutional interpretation. In a brief 
concession, the Court acknowledged Justice Utter’s reminder that the 
Legislature’s “uniquely constituted fact-finding and opinion gathering 
processes provide the best forum” for determining the particulars of 
education funding formulas.
126
 For that reason, the Court declared it will 
not specify the details of staffing ratios, salaries, and similar costs, but it 
                                                     
120. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1860 (SHB 2776); 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331 (ESHB 2261); see 
infra note 152 (explaining due dates in legislation).  
121. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1860. 
122. See REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT 
COMMITTEEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 24–28 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT] (describing 
budget situation, state K-12 expenditures). 
123. See id. at 29. 
124. The decision was published on January 5th. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 
227 (2012). Regular sessions of the legislature begin on the second Monday in January. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 44.04.010 (2015).  
125. Justices Madsen and James Johnson dissented on the decision to retain jurisdiction. 
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 547–48, 269 P.3d at 262–63 (Madsen, J., dissenting in part) (arguing 
that lack of ascertainable standards, as well as deference to legislative function, weigh against 
retaining jurisdiction).  
126. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 517, 269 P.3d at 247 (majority opinion) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. 
v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 551, 585 P.2d at 71 (Utter, J., concurring)). 
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held the judiciary retains full authority to interpret the constitutional 
term “education” by providing broad guidelines and by testing 
legislative enactments against those judicially defined standards.
127
 
The second aspect of Seattle School District on which McCleary 
elaborated is the “relationship between the State’s obligation to provide 
an education and the corresponding right of Washington children to 
receive an education.”
128
 Expanding on Seattle School District’s Hohfeld 
footnote and citing to leading positive rights scholarship, Justice 
Stephens concluded that positive rights demand that the Court view the 
constitution in a qualitatively different light. The distinction between 
positive and negative constitutional rights is significant, she explained, 
because in a negative rights analysis, the judicial inquiry is whether the 
legislative or executive branches have overstepped constitutional 
restraints.
129
 In contrast, “[p]ositive constitutional rights do not restrain 
government action: they require it.”
130
 For this reason, when confronted 
with a positive rights claim, the Court must use a judicial test more 
stringent than a mere rational basis review: the Court asks whether the 
State has “done enough”—“whether the state action achieves or is 
reasonably likely to achieve the constitutionally prescribed end.”
131
 
Applying this new higher standard, the Court invalidated the 
Legislature’s K-12 funding formulas. In rejecting the state’s former
132
 
funding scheme, McCleary explained that those formulas generated 
insufficient state funding, so the resulting state allocations failed to align 
with district costs of implementing the state’s program, thereby forcing 
school districts to depend on local levies to support the basic education 
program.
133
 Reliance on levies to support the cost of the state’s program 
was a shortfall directly in conflict with Seattle School District’s 
prohibition on using levies for basic education.
134
 Ultimately the Court 
concluded that “[s]ubstantial evidence confirms that the state’s funding 
system neither achieved nor was reasonably likely to achieve the 
                                                     
127. Id. at 516–19, 269 P.3d at 246–48. 
128. Id. at 518, 269 P.3d at 247 (emphasis in original). 
129. Id. at 519, 269 P.3d at 248 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Due to the timing of their enactment in 2009 and 2010 respectively, the funding reforms of 
ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 were not squarely before the court, so the court invalidated the state’s 
prior funding formulas.  
133. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 532–39, 269 P.3d at 254–58. 
134. Id. at 539, 269 P.3d at 258. 
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constitutionally prescribed ends under Article IX, section 1.”
135
 
D.  Judicial Oversight in McCleary: Deference Followed by Demands 
In contrast to the Seattle School District Court, the McCleary Court 
chose to retain jurisdiction over the case. The Court declared that it had 
the “benefit of seeing the wheels turn” under the funding reforms of 
ESHB 2261.
136
 But, given the scant progress toward implementation of 
these reforms in the 2011–2013 budget, the “court cannot idly stand by 
as the legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform.”
137
 
Notwithstanding the Court’s sweeping statements about positive 
rights and judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation, and 
notwithstanding the rather perfunctory nods toward the legislative role, 
the initial McCleary ruling contains a pattern of subtle deference to the 
legislative scheme. 
First, in defining the education right, the Court established one 
safeguard against an unlimited state obligation by rejecting an individual 
right to a particular educational outcome. It is an “inescapable truth that 
certain factors critical to a student’s achievement are simply outside the 
state’s control.”
138
 For that reason, article IX required the State to 
provide an opportunity to obtain the education described by the Court 




Next, the Court endorsed the Legislature’s enactment of ESHB 2261, 
indicating that its “promising reform package” would, “if fully 
funded, . . . remedy deficiencies in the K-12 funding system.”
140
 In other 
words, the Court’s initially chosen remedy was implementation of the 
plan already adopted by the Legislature.
141
 Similarly, the compliance 
                                                     
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 543, 269 P.3d at 260. 
137. Id. at 543, 545, 269 P.3d at 260, 261. 
138. Id. at 525, 269 P.3d at 251. 
139. Id. at 525–26, 269 P.3d at 251; see also Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 236, 5 P.3d 
691, 709–10 (2000) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (“Individual children, their parents, and local school 
districts each have standing to compel the Legislature to implement this constitutional mandate. But 
the courts cannot prescribe an individual right to a specific form of education.”). Compare id., with 
Bauries, Right to Education, supra note 76, at 995–1006 (arguing for constitutional education right 
to develop through “common law” of individually adjudicated cases).  
140. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 484, 269 P.3d at 231; see also id. at 543–46, 269 P.3d at 260–61 
(retaining jurisdiction to monitor implementation of ESHB 2261 reforms and article IX compliance 
generally).  
141. See Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 725–26 (discussing Thro’s proposal that 
courts should adopt education funding standards from coordinate branches where possible). 
Fraser_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/1/2016  1:49 PM 
2016] MCCLEARY: RIGHTS, POWERS, AND PROTECTIONS 115 
 
date the Court selected was 2018—the final implementation date 
indicated by the Legislature in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776. However, 
nothing in the ruling expressly confined the article IX right to the 
program and services defined by the Legislature, leaving ample room for 
the Court to obligate the State to provide judicially defined services. 
Despite these encouraging signs that the Court would monitor, rather 
than dictate, legislative implementation of the ESHB 2261 reforms, the 
Court quickly showed its impatience with the Legislature. In the summer 
of 2012, the Court agreed to exercise its oversight by receiving an 
annual progress report submitted by the State, and the Legislature 
established a joint select committee to communicate with the Court via 
these reports.
142
 But, evidently expecting that a ruling handed down the 
week before a supplemental budget legislative session would trigger 
major institutional reforms in sixty days, the Court soon criticized 
legislative inaction.
143
 As predicted by the original dissent, in December 
2012 the Court directed that the Legislature enact or otherwise provide 
the Court with annual, interim benchmarks against which the Court 
could gauge legislative progress toward full implementation.
144
 Even so, 
viewed in the most deferential light, the Court’s first request for a “plan” 
expressed the Court’s intent to respect the legislature’s authority to 
establish guideposts for incremental implementation steps. In effect, the 
Court initially importuned the Legislature to provide the judicial branch 
with benchmarks so that the Court would not have to invent them or 
derive them from other sources.
145
 
In January 2014, notwithstanding the 2013–2015 biennial budget’s 
investment of nearly $1 billion in new state K-12 funding, the Court 
issued another order that not only called for an annual plan but also 
appeared to broaden the supervisory scope.
146
 In the 2014 supplemental 
                                                     
142. Order of July 18, 2012, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyOrder.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/222L-AV8Q]; H. Con. Res. 4410, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). The order 
also permitted the plaintiffs to respond to the state’s report. 
143. See Order of Dec. 20, 2012, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
144. See id. Justice James Johnson dissented from the order. Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012, 
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Compare id., with McCleary, 
173 Wash. 2d at 547–50, 269 P.3d at 262–63 (Madsen, J., dissenting in part) (stating supervision 
will be unhelpful or obstructive without benchmarks). 
145. Cf. Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 5, 9, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (looking to 
executive budget requests and other proposals not enacted by the Legislature to gauge progress).  
146. Id. at 5. Compare id. at 6 (objecting to suspension of school employee-cost-of-living 
adjustments, court declares that “nothing could be more basic than adequate pay”), with McGowan 
v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 293–94, 60 P.3d 67, 74–75 (2002) (noting such adjustments are not part 
of basic education).  
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budget, the Legislature enacted an additional $58 million in K-12 
formula funding, along with substantive policy implementation of basic 
education enhancements to graduation requirements and course credits, 
but it did not pass a “plan” as required by the Court.
147
 In September of 
2014, after this second failure, the Court ruled that the Legislature’s 
apparent inaction constituted contempt of Court, though it held sanctions 
in abeyance until after the close of the 2015 session.
148
 
Given the contempt ruling, the legal and political stakes were high as 
the Legislature began its 2015 regular session. The 2015 session was the 
longest on record, entailing three special sessions that lasted well into 
July. Throughout the prolonged budget debates, the two chambers 
generally agreed on funding the phase-in steps of the statutory formula 
enhancements.
149
 However, the bodies struggled to achieve consensus on 
a solution to the structural
150
 compensation shortfall, in which 
insufficient state salary allocations cause school districts to supplement 
state salary funding with local levy revenue in violation of Seattle 
School District. Although the Legislature did not resolve this debate 
during the 2015 session, nor did it pass a “plan,” on the eve of the fiscal 
new year the chambers enacted a budget that provided $1.3 billion in 
new state funding for K-12, a nineteen percent increase over the 
previous biennium and a thirty-six percent increase since the Court’s 
order of December 2012 decried the lack of progress.
151
 This funding 
                                                     
147. See 2014 REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 15–24, 27 (describing formula and policy changes but 
acknowledging that the Legislature had not enacted an implementation “plan”). 
148. See Order of Sept. 11, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
149. Compare S.S.B. 6050, 64th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (initial Senate 2015-17 
operating budget proposal), with E.S.H.B. 1106, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (initial House 
2015–2017 operating budget proposal).  
150. From a state perspective, the compensation problem identified by the court is structural 
(state salary allocations to districts are insufficient to hire and retain) rather than absolute (total 
salaries offered by districts are insufficient to do so). The state’s data indicate that the total salaries 
teachers actually receive (state allocations plus local supplements) provide market-rate 
compensation comparable to similar professions, such as certified public accountants. JOHN 
BOESENBERG ET AL., QUALITY EDUCATION COUNCIL, COMPENSATION TECHNICAL WORKING 
GROUP FINAL REPORT 111 (2012), http://www.k12.wa.us/Compensation/CompTechWorkGroup 
Report/CompTechWorkGroup.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6W8-K82G] (market comparability studies of 
Dr. Lori Taylor). This means that the constitutional problem with salary funding is not market 
inadequacy of total salaries; it is that a portion of salaries for the state’s program is paid from school 
district taxpayers’ pockets (in the form of school district levies) rather than those of the state 
taxpayers. Seattle School District held, and McCleary confirmed, that the State may not cause 
school districts to rely on local levies to support the State’s program. McCleary 173 Wash. 2d at 
537–39, 269 P.3d at 257–58. 
151. 2015 REPORT, supra note 11, at 5–7 (describing state education spending increases but 
acknowledging that the Legislature had not enacted an implementation “plan”). 
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implemented the formula enhancements of SHB 2776 in compliance 
with the respective due dates enacted in that bill.
152
 
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s funding increases and compliance 
with its own statutory schedule, in August of 2015 the Court declared 
that the Legislature’s actions failed to purge contempt, and as of this 
writing the Court has ordered sanctions against the State of $100,000 per 
day until the Legislature provides the Court with a plan.
153
 This order 
states that the plan must include not merely a list of reforms or a 
schedule for implementation, but apparently also must address the fiscal 




III.  JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF POSITIVE RIGHTS POSES 
SEPARATION OF POWERS RISKS 
The State’s efforts to move toward full compliance with McCleary 
and article IX will involve complex fiscal analysis and legislative 
drafting, as well as difficult political compromise. On top of these near-
term legislative challenges, the broader issue of judicially enforceable 
positive rights poses substantial difficulties in constitutional practice. 
This Part will briefly discuss the separation of powers risks of the 
apparently unbounded positive rights enforced in McCleary. 
McCleary initially called for a dialogic approach, claiming that 
judicial oversight to monitor the legislative response would have “the 
benefit of fostering dialogue and cooperation between coordinate 
branches of state government in facilitating the constitutionally required 
reforms.”
155
 A risk of dialogic enforcement, however, is that it fails to 
                                                     
152. Id. at 3–4. All elements of SHB 2776’s formula enhancements were fully implemented in 
the 2015–2017 biennial budget, except for one remaining increment of K-3 class size reduction, 
which must be implemented by the 2017–2018 school year. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.260(4)(b) 
(2014 & Supp. 2015); 2015 REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. In 2014, the Legislature implemented 
ESHB 2261’s changes to instructional hours (school year 2015–2016) and graduation credits 
(beginning with the class of 2019, i.e., school year 2015–2016). WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220 
(2014 & Supp. 2015). The Legislature has not specified a due date in statute for as-yet unquantified 
reforms to compensation and levies. See 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331, 3332 (“The legislature 
intends that the redefined program of basic education and funding for the program be fully 
implemented by 2018.”); id. at 3331, 3369–71 (declaring intent to enhance salary allocations with 
no date specified); id. at 3331, 3356–57 (declaring intent to revise levies with no date specified); see 
also WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.0531 (2014 & Supp. 2015) (causing current school levy lids to 
expire in 2018, creating a “cliff” by which Legislature must address levy reform). 
153. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
154. Id. 
155. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 546, 269 P.3d at 261. 
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account for the “the elephant in the room”—separation of powers in 
state constitutions.
156
 Washington lacks an express textual separation of 
powers requirement, but nonetheless it has both a vigorous separation of 
powers doctrine
157
 and express provisions that vest fiscal controls solely 
in the legislative branch.
158
 
The McCleary Court acknowledged the separation of powers 
difficulties in a positive rights analysis, but easily resolved the dilemma 
in favor of the judicial branch. Positive rights “test the limits of judicial 
restraint and discretion by requiring the Court to take a more active 
stance in ensuring that the State complies with its affirmative 




Even so, because of the qualitatively different nature of positive 
constitutional rights, judicial enforcement of these rights in the form of 
orders to co-equal branches poses separation of powers risks not found 
in other forms of constitutional enforcement. First, the absence of state 
jurisdictional constraints on judicial actions creates the risk of the 
“perceived imperative to decide,” inviting the courts to intrude into 
policy decisions for which they are institutionally ill-suited. Second, if 
the court defines a constitutional term to include a particular 
constellation of affirmative services, the legislative branch is left without 
a check on that definition, impairing its ability to make policy and fiscal 
decisions for the state. Third, the dialogue of constitutional enforcement 
must not convert judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation to 
judicial supremacy in governing, lest it vitiate the Legislature’s status as 
a co-equal branch. 
A.  Separation of Powers Risks Arise from the “Perceived Imperative 
to Decide” 
When reviewing a case that is rooted in both politics and the state 
                                                     
156. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 739–40; see id. at 728–35 (questioning 
assumptions of positive rights scholars due to their “dismissive” belief that the separation of powers 
doctrine does not affect adjudication). 
157.  See, e.g., State v. Rice, 174 Wash. 2d 885, 900–01, 279 P.3d 849 (2013) (citing recent 
cases); Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 134 n.1, 882 P.2d 173, 177 n.1 (1994) (explaining that 
federal separation of powers doctrine does not control interpretation of state constitution); In re 
Salary of Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1978) (discussing history of doctrine). 
158. See infra Section IV.A. 
159. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 520, 269 P.3d at 248. Compare id., with Seattle Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 512, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (1978) (explaining that article IX duty imposed on the 
state as a polity, not on any one of the three branches). 
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constitution, state court judges must confront the “perceived imperative 
to decide.”
160
 This apparent mandate invites a judicial belief that all 
politico-legal disputes are amenable to a courthouse resolution—that a 
constitutional ruling can solve complex problems of public policy and 
resource allocation. Stated differently, if one’s only tool is a hammer, 
every problem looks like a nail.
161
 As described by Phil Talmadge, who 
served both as a state senator and later as a Washington State Supreme 
Court justice, “[w]hat has emerged too often is a cowboy judiciary riding 
roughshod over separation of powers in its zeal to save every damsel in 
distress and right every wrong.”
162
 
The perceived imperative to decide arises from the absence of 
jurisdictional limits on the authority of state courts. Principles of judicial 
restraint in state courts are jurisprudential rather than jurisdictional.
163
 
This means the political question doctrine and related theories of 
restraint are not a per se bar to judicial consideration of essentially 
political disputes such as legislative resource allocation decisions. For 
that reason, the court is not obligated to make a threshold jurisdictional 
determination of whether the constitution textually commits a matter to 
one of the other branches.
164
 Positive rights advocates specifically argue 
that the absence of jurisdictional limits on state courts should embolden 
judges to enforce positive rights.
165
 
Contributing to the perceived imperative to decide is the experience 
of state court judges in affirmatively making law as common-law 
jurists.
166
 To the extent judges have a law-making role in adjudicating 
                                                     
160. Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General 
Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 695, 710 (1999) [hereinafter Talmadge, Limits of 
Power]. 
161. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15 (1966). 
162. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 695–96 (condemning judicial activism of 
both the left and the right). 
163. Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1833–75 (distinguishing state court 
justiciability from article III jurisdictional doctrines); Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 
1155–69 (distinguishing a state constitutional positive rights analysis from federal rationality 
review). Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 708–11 (contrasting state 
and federal court doctrines of restraint).  
164. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 710. In contrast are cases involving the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s narrow original jurisdiction in mandamus. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 718, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (2009) (no original jurisdiction in mandamus due 
to separation of powers concerns “similar to” the federal political question doctrine).  
165. Herskhoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1156–67 (contrasting state court adjudication of 
positive rights with Article III political question doctrine). 
166. Usman, supra note 27, at 1527–28. Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra 
note 160, at 699 (describing the power of common law as individualized decision-making, given 
that legislatures cannot anticipate all factual circumstances). 
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common-law cases, they are comfortable testing out their theories 
against a background of court-made precedent.
167
 This risk is reinforced 
by judges who are “doctrinally oriented toward the individualized, non-
general decision-making that the common law offers.”
168
 But state 
constitutions are not common law.
169
 Constitutional interpretation is 
document-based, a fundamentally different task. It involves not only 
interpretation of individual words and sections, but the balancing of 
particular rights, duties, or terminology against the background of the 
entire constitutional text and structure. Moreover, constitutional 
interpretation of an affirmative duty applies not only to the facts of the 
case at bar, but throughout the entire state until reversed by a 
constitutional amendment or subsequent judicial decision. 
Any skepticism about the court’s ability to solve persistent policy and 
political debates with constitutional rulings inevitably raises a question: 
having chosen to elevate education to a constitutional duty, are the 
voters not entitled to the benefit of their “constitutional bargain”?
170
 In 
this view, the judiciary is not a participant in an inter-branch power 
struggle, but rather is the neutral arbiter of the people’s compact with the 
state.
171
 The analogy of Odysseus and the sirens is sometimes used to 
characterize the nature of this compact
172
: when sailing past the sirens’ 
isle, Odysseus wishes to hear their song without succumbing to their 
fatal allure, so he directs his sailors to stop their ears with wax and bind 
him to the ship’s mast while ignoring any pleas he might make for 
release.
173
 In other words, if a society feared that the siren song of 
                                                     
167. As makers of common law, judges not only adjudicate but also create and abolish common-
law causes of action. Compare Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980) 
(abolishing the common-law tort of alienation of affections), with Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull 
Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 690 P.2d 190 (1984) (recognizing a new common cause of action for loss 
of parental consortium). Compare id., with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 (2014 & Supp. 2015) 
(establishing common law as rule of decision to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the state 
constitution or statutes, or with the conditions of society in the state). 
168. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 695. 
169. Linde, supra note 98, at 952 (“In the course of deciding the merits, some opinions ignore the 
essential difference between constitutional law and common law: A constitutional issue presupposes 
that someone else has made a law.”). 
170. Usman, supra note 27, at 1517.  
171. Whether the McCleary Court is acting as a mere neutral arbiter of the constitution is in the 
eye of the beholder. Certainly by using the threat of contempt and later contempt sanctions to 
compel not ultimate constitutional compliance but rather submission of the court-ordered “plan,” the 
Court has staked the dignity and credibility of the judicial branch on its ability to coerce the 
Legislature.   
172. See Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the 
People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 313, 324–27 (2008) (criticizing the Odysseus analogy).   
173. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996) (“[I]f you plead, commanding your 
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transitory legislative or voter majorities could result in failure to satisfy a 
core value expressed in the constitution, the voters could codify their 
“pre-commitments” in a higher level of law not subject to 
reinterpretation by a mere temporary political agreement.
174
 In this 
scenario, of course, the judiciary ultimately determines the meaning of 
this pre-commitment. Or, as framed by the McCleary Court: “We cannot 
abdicate our judicial duty to interpret and construe” the constitution.
175
 
This perceived imperative to define the constitution’s education rights 
in the form of a judicial ruling disregards other aspects of the voters’ 
electoral bargain in the constitutional text. The constitution expressly 
vests in the legislative and executive branches the responsibility for 
defining and operating the state’s education system.
176
 As noted by Phil 
Talmadge, constitutionalizing K-12 funding and administration by 
placing it beyond the control of these democratically elected state 
officers leaves education under the control of a branch that is “ill-
equipped to annex such a duty.”
177
 More broadly, as discussed infra 
Section IV.A, the “disfavored” constitution establishes substantive 
separation of powers protections that vest state fiscal decisions solely in 
the legislature. Finally, whatever the merits the “Odysseus” approach 
might have for interpreting restraints on state government, judicial 
interpretation of constitutional terms in a positive rights context poses a 
different issue. 
B. Positive Rights Pose Qualitatively Unique Separation of Powers 
Dilemmas 
A positive constitutional right is very different than other legal rights 
to state-funded services. From Marbury to Seattle School District, 
judicial primacy in interpreting constitutional text means that the court 
has the ultimate ability to define constitutional terms. This power has 
                                                     
men to set you free, then they must lash you faster, rope on rope.”). 
174. Pettys, supra note 172, at 324–27. 
175. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 520, 169 P.3d 227, 246 (2012) (quoting Seattle Sch. 
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 506, 585 P.2d 71, 88 (1978)). Compare id., with Seattle Sch. Dist.,  
90 Wash. 2d at 512, 585 P.2d at 92 (explaining that duty is imposed on the State as a polity, not on 
any one of the three branches). 
176. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 516–17, 169 P.3d at 247; see also WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2 
(“The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.”); WASH. 
CONST. art. III, § 22 (“The superintendent of public instruction shall have supervision over all 
matters pertaining to public schools.”).  
177. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 237, 5 P.3d 691, 710 (2000) (Talmadge, J., 
concurring). 
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two consequences. First, when the court uses this primacy to define 
positive rights, it deprives the Legislature of its ability to make policy 
and fiscal choices about the constitutional subject. Second, it could 
hijack the legislative process, compelling the Legislature to legislate 
prospectively to the court’s standards rather than testing enacted 
legislation against constitutional requirements. 
1. Positive Rights Interpretation Is Unlike Other Forms of Judicial 
Rights Adjudication 
In the course of state policy-setting, legislatures frequently create 
positive statutory rights to public programs and services, but the 
legislature retains the ability to revise or repeal its creations.
178
 Once the 
legislature has enacted such a statute, the judiciary may order agencies to 
provide services to individuals as a matter of statutory entitlement,
179
 but 
crucially—as a matter of separation of powers—the court will not order 
the legislature to make an appropriation for a statutory program.
180
 It is a 
“legislative fact of life” that the legislature may create “laudable 
programs” but fail to fund them adequately: “the decision to create a 




Likewise, when the courts enforce negative constitutional rights 
against the branch that allocates public resources, the legislature still 
retains a choice. The choice may be largely theoretical, but it still exists. 
For example, though it may be politically difficult to cut services to 
persons with mental illness, if the state does not want to fund costs the 
judiciary determines are needed to comply with Fourteenth Amendment 
standards, the state may change involuntary commitment statutes, 
                                                     
178. Cross, supra note 27, at 861 (describing the notion of statutory positive rights as “utterly 
unexceptionable); see also Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301–02, 174 P.3d 
1142, 1150 (2007) (citing Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: 
Washington’s Law of Law-Making, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 478 (2003–2004) (explaining plenary 
legislative power means that one legislature may amend the work of a prior legislature). 
179. Wash. State Coal. for the Homeless v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Serv., 133 Wash. 2d 894, 
923–95, 949 P.2d 1291, 1306–07 (1997). Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 
160, at 730 (criticizing Homeless as a “very troubling” ruling that puts court in the middle of a 
societal dispute about resource distribution). 
180. Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wash. 2d 591, 599, 589 P.2d 1235, 1240 (1979) (noting a possible 
exception if creation of a program is constitutionally required); see also Talmadge, Limits of Power, 
supra note 160, at 729–30 (discussing separation of powers basis for Pannell line of decisions). 
181. Pannell, 91 Wash. 2d at 599, 589 P.2d at 1240; see also Farm Bureau Fed’n, 162 Wash. 2d 
at 301–02, 174 P.3d at 1150. Compare id., with McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 526–27, 269 P.3d at 
251–52 (declaring that court may interpret Article IX to limit legislature’s ability to reduce offerings 
in the basic education program). 
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In contrast to statutory positive rights, and in contrast to “negative” 
constitutional rights, positive constitutional rights leverage the judicial 
branch’s interpretative power to compel the legislative branch to create 
and fund public programs as defined by the court. Where the court 
defines a positive right, the state has no choice
183
: the judicial branch has 
final say in defining the program.
184
  Under this analytical regime, absent 
a constitutional amendment, the duty of the state—and its taxpayers—to 
fund that definition is absolute. 
2. Only the Legislature Can Provide Meaningful Definitions of 
Positive Rights 
From the single constitutional word “education,” the Seattle School 
District Court developed a multi-paragraph description of the 
constitutional education objective. But, this necessarily vague definition 
could not, on its own, translate into the multiplicity of complex formulae 
by which the Legislature allocates state K-12 funding to school districts 
based on districts’ and students’ needs.
185
 As Cooley puts it, because the 
texts of constitutional affirmative duties in themselves do not provide a 
“sufficient rule” for determining the scope of right or duty, 
“supplemental legislation must be had.”
186
 
The constitutional duty and its judicially created corresponding right 
lack meaning and coherence unless defined and rendered operative in 
statutory policies enacted by the people’s representatives. For this 
reason, the legislature has an intended constitutional role in defining 
how the state implements its duty. 
The Seattle School District and McCleary Courts imposed judicial 
definitions of constitutional terms such as “education” and “ample,” but 
Seattle School District wholly deferred to legislation to implement and 
                                                     
182. But see infra Section III.B.3 notes 197–199 and accompanying text (discussing how under 
the “foster and support” clause, the State may have a positive duty to operate mental health 
facilities). 
183. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1897 (describing democratic concern that positive rights 
enforcement requires courts to displace legislative judgments on a large scale).  
184. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 516, 269 P.3d at 246–47 (endorsing Seattle School District’s 
judicial definition of “education”); id. at 526–27, 269 P.3d 251–52 (holding that the legislature’s 
education definition is not set “in constitutional stone” but the Court may impose limits on future 
legislatures’ ability to amend statutory program of education). 
185. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220–.260 (2014 & Supp. 2015) (defining mandatory 
program offerings and establishing general apportionment formulas). 
186. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 98–99. 
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give life to these terms, and McCleary initially did so, endorsing enacted 
legislative reforms. In the absence of a ruling that relates the judicial 
definition to legislative enactments, positive constitutional rights are 
unmoored from the statutes that are constitutionally and practically 
needed to implement them. When constitutional duties are stated so 
broadly as to be inchoate absent implementing legislation, they cannot 
be uprooted from their bases in the text of a foundational document to 
become free-floating judicial mandates on the taxpayer. 
3. Positive Rights Enforcement Risks Commandeering the Legislative 
Process 
Continued judicial oversight poses the risk that the judicial power of 
constitutional interpretation will be used to compel the Legislature to 
enact particular policy and appropriation laws. If the McCleary Court 
had confined its enforcement activities to overseeing incremental 
implementation of scheduled statutory reforms, retained jurisdiction 
would pose less of a risk to legislative policy-making. But the Court’s 
orders have evolved from a request for interim benchmarks to insistence 
on a comprehensive plan to “fully comply with article IX” by achieving 
“full funding of all elements of basic education,” whatever the Court 
believes that to mean.
187
 Each order introduces a judicial demand for the 
Legislature to address a new aspect of K-12 funding, from cost-of-living 
adjustments
188
 to capital construction
189




In the case of positive rights, where the judicial branch is asking in 
the abstract whether the state has “done enough” rather than “done too 
much,”
191
 the court could use its interpretation of the constitutional text 
                                                     
187. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 1, 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
188. See supra note 146.  
189. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 7, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. Although the trial 
court’s order briefly declared that state facilities funding was inadequate, the 2012 McCleary ruling 
did not address the state’s capital funding formulas, much less invalidate them the way it did the 
pre-ESHB 2261 operating formulas. McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 SEA at 55 (King Cty. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). For school construction, the constitution prescribes a plan of shared 
responsibility between the State and school districts, which the State has implemented through the 
School Construction Assistance Program. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (school district capital 
levies and construction bond levies); id. art. VIII, § 1(e) (state guarantee of school district debt); id. 
art. VIII, § 6 (school district debt limits for construction); id. art. IX, § 3 (Common School 
Construction Fund); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.525.162–.166 (2014 & Supp. 2015).  
190. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (requiring the State 
to explain “not only what it expects to achieve . . . but to fully explain how it will achieve the 
required goals” (emphasis in original)). 
191. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d, at 518–19, 269 P.3d at 248 (citing Hershkoff, Positive Rights, 
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to order the state and its taxpayers to create and pay for a variety of 
programs. Bypassing the legislative process of policy-setting and 
resource allocation, judicial enforcement of the education right could 
remove a large portion of the budget from legislative control. As Phil 
Talmadge cautions, the Court must avoid characterizing education rights 
as “absolute,” because doing so arrogates to the judiciary total 
responsibility for operating the state’s education system.
192
 
In education litigation in other states, concern about the judiciary’s 
ability to turn constitutional text into workable funding standards has 
either changed liability decisions or stayed enforcement.
193
 In particular, 
second-generation cases such as McCleary pose enforcement challenges 
for courts that have already found strong positive rights.
194
 In second-
round cases, the court confronts not legislative abdication, but instead an 
active legislative branch with its own evolving vision of adequacy, so 
the court must parse the adequacy of a comprehensive legislative 
response rather than direct the legislature to fill a statutory vacuum. As 
school conditions and the elusive constitutional standard converge, 
breach becomes more difficult to establish.
195
 Further, some scholars 
express doubt that funding alone can change schools, “contending that 
the solution lies not in more money, but in measures such as increased 
accountability, better management, and the flexibility to fire failing 
teachers.”
196
 If the court ventures further into education litigation, it 
could be asked to impose these types of standards by judicial fiat. 
Finally, education is not the only state duty that the judicial branch 
could transform into a positive right, creating the risk that a still larger 
portion of the state budget could be subject to judicial definition and 
more stringent constitutional scrutiny. For example, constitutional 
provisions such as the “foster and support”
197
 clause of article XIII could 
                                                     
supra note 27, at 1137). 
192. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 237, 5 P.3d 691, 710 (2000) (Talmadge, J., 
concurring). 
193. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 100 (citing the example of Massachusetts, where 
“[f]orced to choose between an aggressive remedial stance and abdication of any role in 
adjudicating the education right,” the court bowed out by refusing to find breach). 
194. Id. at 97–111. 
195. Id. at 102–03. 
196. Id. at 96–97 (citing authorities). Compare id., with McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 539–40, 269 
P.3d at 258 (stating that “fundamental reforms are needed . . . . Pouring more money into an 
outmoded system will not succeed,” statements which in this author’s opinion are frequently 
misinterpreted as a statement from the McCleary Court that these types of management reforms are 
required for McCleary compliance). 
197. WASH. CONST. art XIII, § 1; see also Adam Sherman & Hugh Spitzer, Washington’s 
Mandate:  The Constitutional Obligation to Fund Post-Secondary Education, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
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be interpreted to establish state duties and corresponding Hohfeldian 
rights. Although the education right may be “paramount” among these 
duties, if the courts recognize other positive constitutional rights, they 
will be different only in degree, not in kind.
198
 Subjecting state 
expenditures for these purposes to the “has the state done enough?” 
positive rights analysis would make over two-thirds of the state budget 
subject to McCleary-level scrutiny.
199
 
C.  Primacy in Constitutional Interpretation Does Not Alter the Co-
Equal Status of the State Branches 
Judicial enforcement of positive rights against the democratic 
branches impairs the constitutionally established co-equal status of the 
three departments. This risk arises because judicial primacy in 
constitutional interpretation is not judicial supremacy in governing. 
Positive rights advocates insist that state courts must “rise to the 
challenge” and adjudicate positive rights cases despite possible judicial 
difficulty in developing manageable standards and policy expertise.
200
 
Admittedly, these types of exhortations have a basis in Washington’s 
text: as Seattle School District explained, the article IX duty is imposed 
on the State as a polity, not merely on the legislative branch.
201
 But the 
real leverage sought by positive rights advocates in pursuit of their 
preferred policies comes from the finality of the judicial branch’s 
interpretation of a constitutional provision. In general, positive rights 
scholarship strives to qualitatively distinguish state court powers from 
those exercised by federal courts. But, advocates for positive rights must 
necessarily rely on state courts to assert primacy in constitutional 
interpretation, just as the Marbury Court asserted federal interpretational 
primacy over Congress, and the Cooper Court over the states.
202
 
Similarly, in Seattle School District and McCleary, state courts declare 
the finality of their authority to interpret the constitution. But an 
                                                     
ONLINE 15, 32–33 (2014) (arguing that the “foster and support” clause establishes a duty to support 
state higher education institutions). 
198. See Hershkoff, Evolution of State Constitutions, supra note 27, at 817–18 (recognizing risks 
of failing to constitutionalize all types of need).  
199. See BUDGET NOTES, supra note 2, at 157, 163, 276, 305, 331, 351 (summarizing state 2015–
2017 appropriations for purposes potentially subject to article XIII, plus constitutionally protected 
debt service, which is three percent of the NGFS + Op budget).   
200. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1182.  
201. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d. 476 512, 585 P.2d 71, 91–92 (1978). 
202. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (stating under Marbury and the Supremacy Clause, state 
governments are bound by federal courts’ interpretation of the federal Constitution).  
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important distinction remains: at the state court level, the alchemy of 
positive rights interpretation does not convert judicial primacy in 
interpretation into judicial supremacy in governing.
203
 
To compel compliance with the federal Constitution, federal courts 
are entitled to wield the power of the federal Supremacy Clause against 
recalcitrant state actors.
204
 State courts have no such lever against state 
legislatures, which are co-equal branches. Primacy in the authority to 
interpret the constitution does not create a corresponding power of 
enforcement. Unlike the federal government enforcing the supremacy of 
the federal Constitution over the states, the Washington State Supreme 
Court is acting against a co-equal branch. 
Recognition of this concern does not rely on denial of the Court’s 
interpretational primacy. As explained by Seattle School District, the 
Court’s lack of “physical power” to enforce its orders does not affect its 
duty to issue them; “the legality of judicial orders should not be 
confused with the legal consequence of their breach.”
205
 But positive 
rights do not change the recognized judicial function of “saying what the 
law is” into a new ability to tell the Legislature “what the law must be.” 
In the absence of express constraining principles, the Court’s new 
positive rights jurisprudence impairs the Legislature’s status as a co-
equal branch. In the case of negative rights, it is less likely that the Court 
will intrude on legislative policy-setting and resource allocation, because 
the State always has the option of ceasing the violative conduct. But in 
the case of positive rights, the Court is not restraining the democratic 
branches with a “thou shalt not” or a “thou shalt not unless.” Rather, the 
Court is affirmatively specifying the delivery of publicly funded 
services, and short of a constitutional amendment, the Legislature has no 
                                                     
203. Education finance scholarship gives short shrift to concerns over the propriety of judicial 
review. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 707. 
204. In the case of confrontation among the co-equal branches of federal government, the United 
States Supreme Court retains primacy in constitutional interpretation. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of 
constitutional guarantees.”). Certainly the Court may be asked to adjudicate constitutional questions 
with vast fiscal consequences. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct 
2566 (2012) (upholding federal Affordable Care Act). But, the Court may not tell Congress, a co-
equal branch, that it must enact legislation to fund, e.g., health care or education programs. The 
absence of positive rights in the federal Constitution, together with federal principles of judicial 
abstention such as the political question doctrine, mean that only Congress resolves resource 
allocation questions.  
205. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 507, 585 P.2d at 89 (citing Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 
711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
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check on this judicial affirmative definition.
206
 Further, under the new 
positive rights analysis, notwithstanding the political aspects of the case, 
the Legislature and its enactments receive even less protection, because 
the Court now holds implementing legislation to a higher judicial 
standard.
207
 This leaves the Legislature without a corresponding check 
on the judicial branch’s authority to compel expenditures in furtherance 
of a positive right. Regardless of what the Legislature enacts to 
implement the constitution, the Court can always say “Article IX 
requires more.” 
IV.  THE “DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION” 
COUNTERBALANCES POSITIVE RIGHTS 
By combining judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation with a 
positive right, McCleary created a court-defined state funding obligation 
without any expressly delineated jurisprudential boundaries. Though the 
original McCleary ruling recognized the delicate balance of power 
among the branches in positive rights implementation, the opinion and 
its subsequent enforcement orders do not set out any clear doctrinal 
limits on the Court’s ability to obligate the taxpayers to fund positive 
rights. Absent counterbalancing constitutional strictures, the Legislature, 
and the taxpayers from whom the Legislature must extract the state’s 
fiscal resources, have only two options: fund the education right as 
defined by the Court, or amend the constitution. 
The Legislature’s repeated failure to enact the judicially ordered 
“plan,” together with the approach of the legislatively and judicially 
imposed 2018 deadline, will force the Court to determine whether there 
are any outer limits to its authority to enforce positive rights against 
legislative paralysis, intransigence, or outright defiance. To find these 
limiting principles, the Court need look no further than the text of the 
constitution itself. 
                                                     
206. Cf. MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (amended 1988). After Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis 
applied higher scrutiny to classification in welfare legislation, the citizens amended the Montana 
Constitution in 1988 to change “[t]he legislature shall provide such economic assistance” to “may 
provide.” In re T.W., 126 P.3d 491, 495 & n.3 (Mont. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting MT. 
CONST. art. 12, § 3). 
207. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d, 477, 519, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (2012); see also supra 
Section II.C, notes 131–135 and accompanying text. 
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A. The “Disfavored Constitution” Establishes Protections for the 
Public Fisc by Reserving Taxation and Expenditure Authority to 
the Legislature 
Limitations on judicial enforcement of positive rights are already 
found within the constitutional text—in the so-called “disfavored 
constitution.”
208
 By expressly vesting the taxing and spending powers of 
the state solely in the legislative branch, the fiscal restrictions of the 
disfavored constitution protect the legislature’s institutional powers. The 
constitutional damage risked by potential judicial arrogation of the 
legislative powers of taxation and spending affects not only the 
legislative branch’s prerogatives, but also the substantive protections 
afforded to the treasury and the taxpayers by the state constitution. 
Within Washington’s disfavored constitution, article VII of the 
Washington State Constitution establishes strictures on state taxation, 
and article VIII governs debt and expenditures. More particularly, article 
VII, section 5, and article VIII, section 4 provide respectively that taxes 
and expenditures of treasury funds must be enacted in law.
209
 Each of 
these sections further establishes specificity requirements—taxes must 
state an object, and appropriations must state a readily discernable 
amount and may not endure past the fiscal biennium.
210
 
These provisions function as more than mere restraints on the 
legislature. True—the specificity conditions operate as traditional 
restrictions on the legislative process, requiring the legislature to enact 
tax and spending laws in a particular way. But more importantly, the 
statements that taxes and appropriations may be made only pursuant to 
law are affirmations that the power to levy taxes and the power to spend 
the revenues thereby collected are vested only in the peoples’ 
democratically elected representatives—to the exclusion of other 
branches. To the extent that enforcement of positive rights could conflict 
with these exclusive grants of authority, it is the Court’s obligation to 
harmonize, rather than override, these protective portions of the 
                                                     
208. See supra Section I.B (discussing the disfavored constitution). 
209. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (“No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law; and every 
law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same to which only it shall be applied.”); 
id. art. VIII, § 4 (“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, 
or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor 
unless such payment be made within one calendar month after the end of the next ensuing fiscal 
biennium, and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an 
appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to which it is to be 
applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any other law to fix such sum.”). 
210. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5; id. art. VIII, § 4. 
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constitution. 
1.  The Legislature Has Sole Authority over Taxation 
Under article VII, section 5, “no tax shall be levied except in 
pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the 
object of the same to which only it shall be applied.”
211
 Though buried in 
the disfavored constitution, this section has a long pedigree as a shield 
for taxpayers through protection of the prerogatives of their elected 
representatives. As a condition of the ascension of William and Mary, 
Parliament insisted that the English Bill of Rights prohibit taxation by 
royal prerogative: “levying Money for or to the Use of the Crowne, by 
pretence of Prerogative, without Grant of Parlyament, for longer time, or 
in other manner then the same is or shall be granted, is Illegal.”
212
 
Similar restrictions appear before nationhood in the earliest state 
constitutions. John Adams’ eloquent Massachusetts State Constitution of 
1780 led the way toward the tripartite, balanced government that the 
Union would eventually adopt.
213
 As originally ratified, and to this day, 
the Massachusetts Constitution declares that no tax may be levied 
“without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the 
legislature.”
214
 Likewise, taxpayer protections are reflected in the United 
States Constitution, which declares that “All bills for raising revenue 
shall originate in the House of Representatives,” which at nationhood 
was the federal chamber directly elected by the voters.
215
 
Keeping this legacy in mind, article VII, section 5 is not a mere 
technicality but an assurance that “Taxes can be voted only by the 
people’s representatives.”
216
 “It is elementary that the power of taxation, 
subject to constitutional limitations, rests solely in the legislature.”
217
  As 
Cooley explained in 1883, the taxing power is inherent in the legislature 
of each state, and security against the abuse of this power is found in the 
structure of government itself: “In imposing a tax, the legislature acts 
                                                     
211. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5. 
212. English Bill of Rights, 1689 (1 W&M., 2d Sess., c.2). 
213. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 50–53 (describing Adams’ view of balanced government).    
214. MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XXIII; see also PA. CONST. of 1776, § 41 (requiring that any tax 
be authorized in law). 
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
216. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 641 (“It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing 
officers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they assume to impose in every 
instance.”). 
217. Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash. 2d 752, 770, 131 P.3d 892, 901 (2006) 
(quoting State ex rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 176 Wash. 689, 690, 30 P.2d 638, 639 (1934)). 
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 Suggestions that the Court has authority to 
enforce positive rights by nullifying tax exemptions, levying new taxes, 
or specifying the uses of tax revenues directly conflict with this 
constitutional principle.
219
 In its Order of August 2015, the McCleary 
Court briefly but expressly recognized this distribution of powers, 
acknowledging that the Court lacks the authority to enact legislation, 
appropriate state funding, or levy taxes.
220
 As in the case of judicial 
“impoundment” of unspecified state revenues pursuant to the August 
2015 contempt sanctions, the judicial distinction between saying “what 
the law is” and enforcing that law may be a very fine one.
221
 But the 
difficulty in drawing the precise line does not negate the mandatory 
character of disfavored constitution as a limiting principle on the Court’s 
ability to enforce positive rights. 
2.  The Legislature Has Sole Authority over Appropriations 
Under article VIII, section 4, “No moneys shall ever be paid out of 
the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its 
management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.” Per 
article VII, section 6, state tax revenues must be deposited in the state 
treasury. This means that the Legislature has the exclusive power of 
deciding whether, when, and for what purpose the state’s public moneys 
may leave the treasury, and also that the procedural law-making 
protections of constitutional majority, bicameralism, and presentment 
are necessary to spend all state tax revenues. As with the taxing 
provision, the requirement that appropriations be enacted in law is 
rooted in the English Bill of Rights’ prohibition on arrogating moneys 
for the use of the crown.
222
 The legislation requirement necessarily 
excludes the judicial branch from the process of enacting appropriations 
or otherwise authorizing expenditures.
223
 
                                                     
218. Id. at 593–94. 
219. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Timely 2016 Briefing Schedule at 13–15, McCleary v. State, 
173 Wash. 2d, 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/ 
Supreme%20Court%20News/843627McClearyPlaintiffsMotionforTimely2016Briefing 
Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ3D-2E3T] (asking the court to invalidate tax exemption statutes as 
a contempt sanction). 
220. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. 
221. See supra Section III.B.1, notes 178–181 and accompanying text (discussing potentially fine 
distinction between ordering an appropriation and ordering an agency to provide a service). 
222. English Bill of Rights, 1689 (1 W&M., 2d Sess., c.2). 
223. “Whether such a [court-appointed special master] could take money out of the treasury 
would be a really significant constitutional question on the separation of powers” according to 
former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Phil Talmadge. Andrew Garber, How Will State 
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The legislature’s duty to provide essential funding for the other 
branches of government must be acknowledged as a noteworthy but 
limited exception to this general rule. In In re Salary of Juvenile 
Director,
224
 the Court used a structural separation of powers analysis to 
find the Court has an inherent but constrained power to compel 
appropriations necessary to “ensure its own survival”
225
 upon “clear, 
cogent, and convincing proof.”
226
 Significantly, Juvenile Director did 
not analyze the text, purpose, or history of article VIII, section 4 in the 
broader context of constitutional protections for tax revenues.
227
 But 
Juvenile Director addresses only the judiciary’s ability to function 
within the constitutional structure as an independent branch, and under 
article VIII, section 4, it gives the Court no authority to order 




3. The Disfavored Constitution Establishes a Principle of 
Contemporaneous Government 
Article VIII, section 4, establishes a principle of contemporaneous 
government, a concept that limits the usefulness of the Court’s repeated 
calls for a legislative “plan.” 
Specifically, this section provides that appropriations must be made 
within a month of the close of the next ensuing biennium, i.e., the 
biennium that begins after the adjournment of the legislative session in 
odd numbered years.
229
 This means that appropriations lapse (expire) at 
the end of the fiscal biennium for which they are made, so each elected 
Legislature appropriates roughly for the period for which it sits. The 
delegates at the state constitutional convention established this limited 
                                                     
Supreme Court React If Lawmakers Hold Back on School Funding?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014 
at B7. 
224. 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). 
225. Id. at 245, 552 P.2d at 171.. 
226. Id. at 251, 552 P.2d at 174. In Seattle School District, the State argued based on Juvenile 
Director that a higher burden of proof should apply to the education duty. The Court dismissed this 
distinction: “Here, unlike Juvenile Director, the financial needs of the judiciary vis-à-vis the 
Legislature are not at issue. Rather, we are concerned with legislative compliance with a specific 
constitutional mandate.” Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d. 476, 528, 585 P.2d 71, 100 (1978). 
227. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 242–43, 552 P.2d at 169 (citing WASH. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 4 only in passing). 
228. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 528, 585 P.2d at 100. 
229. At statehood, regular sessions of the Legislature were held biennially beginning in January 
of odd-numbered years, with a two-year budget adopted for the period following adjournment. 
WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. II, § 12. 
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duration for appropriations because California had exceeded its debt 
limit by authorizing appropriations for future biennia.
230
 
When combined with the broader constitutional principles that 
legislative power is plenary and any Legislature may amend the work of 
a prior Legislature,
231
 article VIII, section 4 affirms that the people are 
governed by the legislators they elected, not by dead hands of prior 
legislators. Although the Court has declared that the Legislature may not 
revise its basic education statutes for mere pecuniary reasons,
232
 no 
Legislature may definitively declare that any “plan” commits a future 
Legislature to follow any particular set of standards, formulas, or 
revenue policies, and no Legislature may “pre-enact” the appropriations 
needed to give future life to the “plan.”  Stated differently, talk is 
cheap—whiskey costs money. The real question is whether the sitting 
Legislature has enacted the appropriations to implement its enacted 
statutes. 
B.  The Disfavored Constitution’s Taxpayer Protections Are a Part of 
the “Electoral Bargain” 
If state courts wish to accept the expansive aspects of state 
constitutionalism, such as the New Federalism and positive rights, they 
must acknowledge the constraints of the disfavored constitution as 
requirements of equal stature.
233
 Even “as they impose affirmative duties 
on their government, state constitutions are also marked by limited-




Positive rights advocates correctly argue that analysis of positive 
rights should not import federal concepts that are extraneous to state 
constitutions, such as rationality-level review or the political question 
                                                     
230. JOURNAL, supra note 69, at 673–75; see also S.F. Gas Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641, 642 
(1882) (holding article XI, section 18 of the California Constitution prohibited municipalities from 
paying liabilities incurred in one year with revenues of a later year absent the 2/3 voter approval 
constitutionally necessary to incur debt). In comparison, the modern Washington constitutional debt 
limit in article VIII, section 1 requires a supermajority legislative vote to bind future Legislatures by 
creating debt. WASH. CONST. art VIII, § 1(i) (amended 1972). 
231. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301–02, 174 P.3d 1142, 1150 (2007) 
(citing Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington’s Law of Law-
Making, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 478 (2003–2004)). 
232. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 526–27, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (holding that elements 
of the basic education program are not “etched in constitutional stone,” but the Legislature may not 
eliminate or reduce program offering without an educational reason). 
233. Briffault, supra note 18, at 956. 
234. Id. 
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 Using state tax and spending restrictions as a restraint on 
judicial positive rights enforcement flows naturally from the bargain that 
the state constitution strikes with the people in its own text. The 
disfavored constitution provides the judiciary with the ability to give 
meaning to affirmative duties in state constitutions while acknowledging 
that the very text of state constitutions contains outer boundaries on the 
court’s ability to define and enforce positive rights. 
1.  The Disfavored Constitution Is Substantive and Mandatory 
The paramount duty may be paramount among constitutional 
provisions that establish rights or duties, but the judiciary is obligated to 
harmonize its interpretation of this duty, and enforcement thereunder of 
its jural correlative right, with the structural provisions of the 
constitution that place the state fisc under the authority of the voters’ 
representatives. 
Positive rights commentators argue courts must enforce positive 
rights so “the electorate should be given the benefit of their 
constitutional bargain.”
236
 Further, as the Seattle School District and 
McCleary Courts point out, only one provision of the constitution 
declares itself to be “paramount.” At the same time, positive rights are 
only one part of the “electoral bargain.” Just as article IX 
constitutionalizes a state education duty, the disfavored constitution 
constitutionalizes a norm of taxpayer protection.
237
 
To begin, all provisions of the constitution are equally mandatory.
238
 
The constitutional text declares the education duty to be “paramount” 
among state activities, but this text does not make other provisions 
structurally subordinate, and it does not overwrite the equally mandatory 
provisions that vest taxing and spending authority solely in the 
Legislature. 
Moreover, “structural” provisions of state constitutions may 
nonetheless declare protective principles that that receive judicial 
enforcement. For example, Washington’s Constitution does not contain 
an express textual separation of powers clause, but the division of state 
government into three branches is nonetheless a crucial protection for 
                                                     
235. E.g, Herskhoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1156–67 (contrasting state court 
adjudication of positive rights with article III political question doctrine). 
236. Usman, supra note 27, at 1517. Compare id., with Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1915 (coupling 
strong right with weak remedies may create cynicism about the constitution). 
237. Briffault, supra note 18, at 909. 
238. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29. 
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 Similarly, though not expressly framed as a 
“rights” provision, the disfavored constitution provides important 
protection for the public fisc and for the people’s relationship with their 
elected representatives. Further, McCleary itself demonstrates that not 
all constitutional rights are found in constitutional articles denominated 
“Declaration of Rights.” The tax and spending restrictions in the 
disfavored constitution place in the constitutional text the people’s right 
to have state fiscal policy determined by their elected representatives. 
More broadly, when considering the electoral bargain, a constitutional 
analysis of positive rights enforcement must consider the source of the 
government’s powers and duties—the political power that is inherent in 
the people and is bestowed on government only by their consent.
240
 
Under the covenant by which the voters delegated their political power 
to state government, the people were assured that their elected 
representatives would control state taxation and expenditures. Though 
some positive rights advocates contend that elected state court judges 
enjoy a democratic imprimatur that justifies a greater role for them in 
public resource allocation decisions,
241
 Washington courts have rejected 
the notion that state court judges play a “representative” role in state 
government.
242
 For these reasons, judicial branch enforcement of 
positive rights must respect the constitutional vesting of fiscal authority 
in officials who are elected to represent their constituents. 
Evidence that the electoral bargain of the disfavored constitution 
creates taxpayer protections is found in flexible doctrines of taxpayer 
standing in state courts.  In contrast to stringent standing requirements in 
federal court, Washington and other state courts generally grant broad 
taxpayer standing to enforce constitutional protections for the public 
fisc.
243
 These decisions reveal “an appreciation of the role that taxpayer 
                                                     
239. E.g., State v. Rice, 174 Wash. 2d 885, 900–01, 279 P.3d 849, 857 (2013) (discussing how 
the tripartite division and system of checks protects individual rights in the criminal justice system).  
240. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.  
241. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1157–58; see also Hershkoff, Passive Virtures, 
supra note 27, at 1887 (claiming elected judges “carry a democratic portfolio”); Paul W. Kahn, 
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993) 
(“[State court judges’] institutional position can be thought of as intermediate between that of 
federal judges and that of elected representatives.”). However, Hershkoff acknowledged that 
election does not turn “black-robed judges into representative decisionmakers.” Hershkoff, Positive 
Rights, supra note 27, at 1158. 
242. Eugster v. State, 171 Wash. 2d 839, 259 P.3d 146 (2011) (holding judiciary’s role is distinct 
from legislative branch due to obligations of impartiality and independence; election of judges does 
not make them like legislative or administrative elected officials whose core duties are to speak for 
and carry out their constituents’ interests). 
243. Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional 
 
Fraser_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/1/2016  1:49 PM 
136 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 91:91 
 
suits play in correcting government transgressions.”
244
 Notably, flexible 
taxpayer standing is an important link between positive rights advocacy 
and the disfavored constitution, where this standing is used to enforce 
state constitutions’ “positive rights and regulatory norms,” including 
constitutional restrictions on taxes, debt, and expenditures.
245
 
2.  Nevada’s Interpretational Misstep Demonstrates the Duty to 
Harmonize Education Rights and the Disfavored Constitution 
Because of its disfavored status of state fiscal protections, courts may 
be tempted to use interpretational techniques that allow “rights” 
provisions to eclipse mere “structural” provisions. Nevada’s failed 
interpretational experiment underscores the need for Washington to 
employ the interpretational technique mandated by article I, section 29’s 
statement that all provisions are mandatory. 
After a brief flirtation with allowing “substantive” constitutional 
duties to trump “procedural” fiscal provisions, Nevada quickly reversed 
its position and conceded judicial interpretation requires the State to read 
its constitution as a whole, with each provision harmonized. In Guinn v. 
Legislature,
246
 the Nevada Supreme Court faced “legislative paralysis” 
over the votes needed to pass a school appropriations bill and supporting 
revenue legislation, given a fairly new voter-initiated constitutional 
amendment that required a two-thirds legislative vote to increase 
taxes.
247
 The Guinn Court concluded that when “a procedural 
requirement that is general in nature prevents funding for a basic, 
substantive right, the procedure must yield,” and the supermajority 
provision could not be used to avoid other constitutional duties.
248
  But 
                                                     
Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1290–
91 (2012).  
244. Friends of N. Spokane Parks v. Spokane, 184 Wash. App. 105, 116–20, 336 P.3d 632, 638 
(Ct. App. 2014) (discussing taxpayer standing at length, distinguishing Greater Harbor, and citing 
Urquhart, supra note 243). Compare id., with Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 
267, 281, 37 P.2d 1082, 1090 (1997) (requiring greater showing for taxpayer standing to challenge 
discretionary decision). 
245. Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1889–90; Urquhart, supra note 243, at 1290–
91. 
246. Guinn v. Legislature (Guinn II), 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003). Guinn II denied a rehearing of 
Guinn v. Legislature (Guinn I), 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003). Eventually, Guinn II was overruled by 
Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). The Guinn Court assumed that the 
Nevada Constitution imposed a “mandate” to fund public education. Guinn II, 76 P.3d at 31 (citing 
constitutional provisions).  
247. Guinn II, 76 P.3d at 29. 
248. Guinn I, 71 P.3d at 1275; Guinn II, 76 P.2d 32–33. Cf. Hans Linde, What Is a Constitution, 
What Is Not, and Why Does It Matter?, 87 OR. L. REV. 717, 728 (2008) (noting if constitution 
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just a few years later, Nevada retreated from this interpretational 
position, rejecting Guinn’s artificial substantive/procedural distinction 
and declaring that the constitution “should be read as a whole, so as to 
give effect to and harmonize each provision.”
249
 
3.  Positive Rights Must Be Balanced with the Disfavored 
Constitution’s Democratic Protections for Taxpayers 
Considered in light of the disfavored constitution, the Washington 
State Supreme Court’s new jurisprudence must address how positive 
rights create an unavoidable burden for the taxpayer. If a court fails to 
enforce a positive right in a foundational document, then arguably that 
document loses its primacy, undermining respect for the rule of law.
250
 
At the same time, if the Court takes an enforcement approach that 
conflicts with other constitutional provisions, it likewise undermines the 
value of the constitution. 
This tension hearkens back to the Odysseus analogy: to what higher 
values did the voters bind themselves, and subsequent generations, when 
they ratified the constitution?
251
 
The paramount duty declares an important constitutional norm of 
educational opportunities for children, but the taxing and spending 
provisions of state constitutions also declare important norms of 
separation of powers, popular representation, and taxpayer protection. 
Even if the ratifying voters intended the paramount duty clause to create 
judicially enforceable positive rights, these same voters did not delegate 
budgeting and taxing authority to the judicial branch. Using positive 
rights enforcement to compel expenditures defined by the judiciary 
rather than the Legislature conflicts with the disfavored constitution. 
Ultimately, the people define the resources that are available to state 
government. It is the most fundamental aspect of popular 
constitutionalism. They may do so directly through voter-initiated 
measures that cut state taxes
252
 or increase state budget obligations.
253
 
                                                     
places both expenditures and revenue policies beyond the control of a legislative majority, state 
cannot function as a republican government).  
249. Beers, 142 P.2d at 348. 
250. Usman, supra note 27, at 1530–32. 
251. Odysseus’ directive to his sailors did not affect his son Telemachus, for example, or any 
future generations home in Ithaca. See Pettys, supra note 172, at 325 (“Those who ratified the 
Constitution elected to try to bind not only themselves, but future generations who were not even 
parties to the deliberations, as well.”). 
252. See 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 141 (repealing tax increases enacted the previous legislative 
session). 
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They may do so indirectly through the legislatures they choose and the 
guidance they provide to those representatives. In turn, these 
manifestations of the people’s political power shape the programs 
funded by the state in the budget that the legislature must balance among 
a host of competing priorities. Collectively, the people get what they pay 
for. 
Under the Odysseus analogy, the Court in fulfilling its interpretational 
task must adhere to the people’s highest values as expressed in the 
constitution, rather than to the will of a transitory legislative or popular 
majority as expressed in any particular budget, bill, or ballot measure.
254
 
But when the Court, through positive rights interpretation, 
constitutionalizes a portion of the state budget, it is also imposing an 
unavoidable tax burden on the people, constitutionally dedicating an 
unspecified revenue stream to support the right as defined by the Court. 
If the right is defined judicially rather than through “supplemental 
legislation,” the voters are deprived of a say in how the State establishes 
and allocates their tax contributions. Notwithstanding the voters’ policy 
and fiscal preferences as expressed in their votes for legislators or ballot 
measures, the Court is telling the people that their judicially defined 
highest values require billions of dollars in new taxes or in cuts to other 
state programs. To illustrate the scope of the legislature’s dilemma, the 
budget could eliminate state funding for the entire state higher education 
system and still lack sufficient resources to correct the structural salary 
shortfall identified in McCleary.
255
 Notwithstanding the priorities of the 
voters and their representatives, the paramount duty clause could 
consume all the resources available to government for its other 
constitutionally required tasks, from operation of the constitutional state 
offices to other possible positive duties,
256
 as well as essential but not 
constitutionally specified programs for public peace, health, and safety. 
Given that all constitutional provisions are equally mandatory, and that 
all provisions are part of the electoral bargain ratified by the people, 
orders in furtherance of the paramount duty do not trump the reservation 
of taxing and spending authority to the legislative branch. 
                                                     
253. See 2015 Wash. Sess. Laws 11 (requiring the State to fund additional school staff as part of 
the basic education program). 
254. See Pettys, supra note 172,(discussing Odysseus analogy).  
255. Total state NGFS + Op appropriations in the 2015–2017 budget for state higher education 
institutions and financial aid are $3.525 billion, or 9.2 percent of total NGFS + Op appropriations—
about the same amount as one of the lower estimates of the salary shortfall. BUDGET NOTES, supra 
note 2, at 305; see supra note 2 (describing shortfall estimates). 
256. See Talmadge, Property Absolutism, supra note 38, at 872–76 (listing other possible positive 
duties). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Seattle School District, the Court pledged the State to a unique 
positive rights interpretation of the paramount duty clause, but it avoided 
the dilemmas of enforcement against the political branches. Now, in 
McCleary, the Court has reaffirmed its commitment to a positive 
education right, but it has ventured into the “Stygian swamp”
257
 of 
positive rights enforcement against a co-equal branch of state 
government, the only branch to which the people delegated the political 
authority to levy taxes and to spend the revenue raised thereby. From the 
perspective of the state fisc, judicially enforceable positive rights pose 
unique risks to separation of powers due to the lack of constitutional 
checks to counterbalance the scope of the judicial branch’s 
interpretation. 
The judicially and statutorily imposed 2018 deadline is approaching. 
The Court declared that the Legislature’s failure to provide the judicially 
requested “plan” constitutes sanctionable contempt of court. Under SHB 
2776, the Legislature has funded its statutorily defined education 
enhancements in compliance with their respective statutory due dates.
258
 
Admittedly, the Legislature has not yet corrected the structural shortfall 
in state salary allocations, but again, the deadline for funding reform has 
not yet elapsed. 
If the Court fails to enforce a positive right in the foundational 
document, then arguably that document loses its primacy, undermining 
respect for the rule of law and for the Court as a branch.
259
 Yet the same 
result occurs if the Court enforces the document selectively, failing to 
acknowledge that the delegation of political power in the constitution 
itself establishes outer bounds for judicial enforcement of other 
constitutional provisions. The disfavored constitution protects both the 
Legislature’s fiscal powers and the people’s right to have these decisions 
made solely by their elected representatives. The disfavored status of the 
fiscal constitution among academics and the judiciary “may be helpful in 
reminding us of the need for modesty” in assuming that state 
constitutions are a force for judicially defined independent constitutional 
                                                     
257. Neb. Coal. for Ed. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007) 
(rejecting school funding challenge to avoid “the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the 
duties of a legislature”).  
258. See supra note 152 (discussing statutory due dates and implementation steps taken in 2015–
2017). 
259. Usman, supra note 27, at 1530–32; see also Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1915 (describing risk 
that lack of alignment between strength of right and remedy may create cynicism about 
constitution). 
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An approach that balances positive duties with restrictions in the 
disfavored constitution results in greater fealty to the foundational 
document’s textual and structural protection for the relationship between 
the people and their government. Or, stated differently, “I’m not saying 





                                                     
260. Briffault, supra note 18, at 957. 
261. WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Columbia Pictures 1989). Compare id., with Tushnet, supra 
note 44, at 1898 (“Nonjusticiable rights need not be legally irrelevant.”). 
